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Abstract 
Many individuals with High-Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder (HFASD) 
experience difficulties communicating effectively in their social world. It has been 
suggested that low levels of theory of mind, the ability to recognize that other individuals 
have unique beliefs, desires, emotions, and perspectives, may be a significant 
contributing factor to these social communicative challenges. Many current interventions 
focus on increasing theory of mind ability in individuals with HFASD. However, 
preliminary research shows that theory of mind interventions may have an unintended 
consequence of increasing the level of stress these individuals experience in social 
situations. This study explores the impact of both theory of mind and emotional 
intelligence on the social stress level of individuals with HFASD. Results from this study 
suggest that introducing emotional intelligence components to current theory of mind 
interventions may increase the individual’s understanding of others and their ability to 
succeed socially without increasing their level of social stress. 
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Chapter One: Overview and Introduction 
  Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by underdeveloped social 
interaction and communicative abilities, as well as repetitive patterns of behaviour 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). A subset of individuals within the 
autism spectrum exhibit underdeveloped intellectual or language abilities; these 
individuals are often referred to as displaying High-Functioning ASD (HFASD; APA, 
2013). Due to the intact cognitive abilities of individuals with HFASD, attention is drawn 
to their difficulties within social interaction and communication (Lopata, Volker, Putnam, 
Thomeer, & Nida, 2008). These social and emotional challenges cause difficulties in 
many important areas of functioning, including within interpersonal and vocational 
domains (APA 2013). Thus, individuals with HFASD often have difficulties living 
independently in adulthood, as it may be challenging for these individuals to interact with 
others, as well as to maintain paid employment (Howlin, 2000; Tsatsanis, 2003), despite 
their typically intact cognitive abilities. Importantly, it appears that early diagnosis and 
intervention may improve the quality of life, and thus long-term outcome, for these 
individuals (Tidmarsh & Volkmar, 2003). Early intervention and appropriate support for 
individuals with HFASD can help minimize challenging experiences and ensure that 
existing skills are developed to their fullest (Howlin, 2000). Further, the positive impact 
of effective professional and peer support found in early intervention can mitigate the 
negative impact of social and emotional challenges on an individual’s quality of life 
(Renty & Roeyers, 2006). To improve these individual’s quality of life, the individual 
must perceive the intervention as personally supportive (Renty & Roeyers, 2006). 
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Consequently, establishing effective early interventions is of great importance to the 
researchers and professionals who work with children and adolescents with HFASD  
One of the primary areas of difficulty that individuals with HFASD experience is 
in social cognition (Mazza et al., 2017), and as a result, social cognition has become the 
focus in many interventions. Social cognition focuses on the cognitive mechanisms 
needed to process the social world (Mazza et al., 2017). One area of study in the field of 
social cognition is theory of mind development. Theory of mind is the ability to attribute 
mental states to others, such as beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978). Theory of mind is crucial to successful social interactions (Saxe, Carey, 
& Kanwisher, 2004), as it is used to predict and interpret the behaviour of others 
(Ferguson & Austin, 2010). In contrast to typically developing individuals who use 
theory of mind to excel in social situations, theory of mind tends to be impaired in 
individuals with ASD from infancy, including those with HFASD (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, 
& Frith, 1985; Mazza et al., 2017), and ultimately contributes significantly to the social 
difficulties these individuals experience. Thus, interventions are typically aimed at further 
developing theory of mind in those with HFASD in hopes that they will experience more 
positive social outcomes. 
 Another related, yet distinct, concept that influences an individual’s ability to 
successfully function in a social capacity is emotional intelligence (Ferguson & Austin, 
2010). Emotional intelligence involves the ability to appropriately express and accurately 
perceive and identify the emotions of others (Ferguson & Austin, 2010). Emotional 
intelligence is framed within two main theories: the first describes this concept as a 
cognitive ability (ability models; Mayer & Salovey, 1997) and the second defines it as a 
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personality trait (trait models; Bar-On, 1997). Regardless of the model, both versions of 
emotional intelligence contribute greatly to successful social interactions for typically 
developing individuals (Ferguson & Austin, 2010). Importantly, both ability and trait 
emotional intelligence tend to be consistently and significantly lower in individuals with 
ASD than in their typically developing peers (Boily, Kingston, & Montgomery, 2017). 
Deficits in emotional intelligence not only impede social success for individuals with 
HFASD, but also contribute to distress, subsequently heightening the individual’s risk for 
depression and/or anxiety (Bellini, 2004; Boily et al., 2017; Vickerstaff, Heriot, Wong, 
Lopes, & Dossetor, 2007).   
 Impaired theory of mind and emotional intelligence are often the foci of 
interventions for individuals with HFASD, as these competences have improved social 
abilities in typically developing individuals (Liddle & Nettle, 2006). It is important to 
note however, that the relationships between theory of mind, emotional intelligence and 
social competence observed in typically developing individuals may not commensurate 
with those found in individuals with HFASD. Preliminary evidence suggests that 
increased theory of mind and underdeveloped emotional intelligence may be associated 
with higher levels of social stress in adolescents with HFASD (Montgomery, Stoesz, & 
McCrimmon, 2012). Simply stated, when individuals with HFASD develop theory of 
mind without further developing emotional intelligence, they are also increasingly aware 
of their social and emotional challenges, relative to other individuals of a similar age. 
This greater understanding of the perspectives of others, which may not always be 
positive, may increase the stress experienced in social contexts for these individuals. 
Consequently, this may exacerbate the social challenges these individuals experience in 
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their social interactions. The paucity of research regarding the nature of the relationship 
between theory of mind, emotional intelligence, and social stress in individuals with 
HFASD, relative to individuals who are typically developing, suggests this is an area of 
study that is critical to investigate further.  
This study aimed to gain insight into the relationship between theory of mind, 
emotional intelligence, and social stress in individuals with HFASD during the critical 
developmental transition into adulthood. The outcome of this research is likely to have 
important implications for interventions. Understanding how theory of mind and 
emotional intelligence interventions impact the social stress levels of those that are 
typically developing relative to those with HFASD, may further inform the treatment 
approach of practitioners in a way that better serves the unique needs of this population. 
As an example, although theory of mind and emotional intelligence may be targeted 
separately in social skills interventions for those that are typically developing, 
interventions for those with HFASD may need to increase theory of mind while 
concurrently building emotional intelligence levels to most effectively meet the social 
and emotional needs of these individuals. A more comprehensive understanding of this 
relationship has the potential to improve the effectiveness of existing social and 
emotional interventions for those with HFASD and consequently, to positively impact 
their mental health. Ultimately, the hope is that it might also help to ease the transition 
into adulthood for late adolescents with HFASD. 
Research Questions 
 This study explored the relationships between theory of mind, emotional 
intelligence and social stress by answering the following questions:  
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(a) To what extent do increases in performance on an advanced theory of mind test 
and an emotional intelligence inventory affect the social stress levels of 
adolescents with HFASD? 
(b) To what extent does performance on an advanced theory of mind test and on an 
emotional intelligence inventory affect social stress levels differently for 
individuals with HFASD when compared to their age- and sex-matched typically 
developing peers? 
Hypotheses 
 Based on previous research (Liddle & Nettle, 2006; Montgomery et al., 2012), it 
is hypothesized that increased performance on theory of mind and emotional intelligence 
measures will decrease social stress levels in typically developing individuals. 
Importantly however, heightened theory of mind scores and low emotional intelligence 
scores are hypothesized to increase social stress levels in individuals with HFASD. Thus, 
theory of mind is hypothesized to be positively related to social stress while emotional 
intelligence is negatively related to social stress. This is thought to be the case for 
individuals with HFASD, as it is hypothesized that increased theory of mind abilities may 
enhance awareness of both positive and negative social cues for these individuals, as they 
would be better able to interpret emotional information through facial expressions and 
emotionally laden communication. Consequently, it is possible that further developing 
theory of mind through interventions, without concurrently increasing emotional 
intelligence, may lead to higher levels of stress in social situations due to the lack of 
social and emotional knowledge and skills needed to respond to this increased 
understanding of others’ perspectives.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 Theory of mind, emotional intelligence, social stress, and HFASD are all complex 
concepts on their own and become increasingly multifaceted when they are studied 
together. This literature review will begin by discussing the diagnostic symptomatology 
of ASD and move into the importance of finding effective interventions for those with 
HFASD. Next, the concept of theory of mind will be explored, its developmental 
trajectory in individuals with HFASD, and its importance to social communicative 
abilities. Emotional intelligence will then be examined through both the ability and trait 
perspectives. The ways in which theory of mind and emotional intelligence relate will be 
discussed (as they are extremely similar, yet distinct, concepts). The final portion of this 
literature review will explore how social stress impacts those with HFASD. Finally, all of 
these variables are drawn together by exploring potential reasons for their distinct 
relationship throughout previous literature.  
Autism Spectrum Disorder  
 Diagnostic criteria of ASD. ASD is characterized by social communicative 
developmental delays, as well as restrictive and repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests 
and activities, and diagnostic criteria across both domains must be met to receive an ASD 
diagnosis (APA, 2013). Diagnostic criteria outline the persistent deficits in social 
communication and interaction that individuals on the autism spectrum experience across 
multiple contexts throughout their life (Ahlstrom & Wents, 2014). These social deficits 
manifest through challenges in social-emotional reciprocity, nonverbal communicative 
behaviors, and consequently, in understanding, developing, and maintaining relationships 
(APA, 2013). Individuals with ASD may display their difficulties with social-emotional 
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reciprocity through atypical approaches to social situations, or lack thereof completely. 
As an example, these deficits are frequently evident in difficulties in typical reciprocal 
conversations, which require adherence to conversational rules such as turn-taking during 
discourse, and not only discussing one’s own areas of interest (Bauminger-Zviely, Karin, 
Kimhi, & Agam-Ben-Artzi, 2013; Nadig, Lee, Singh, Bosshart, & Ozonoff, 2010). These 
social reciprocity and conversation skills first emerge in early childhood, having been 
overserved in typically developing children by the age of three to five years (Adams, 
2002). In addition, individuals with ASD may display disinterest in peers, or an inability 
to appropriately adjust their behaviour for specific social contexts (APA, 2013).  Deficits 
in nonverbal communicative behaviors used for social interaction are also evident in poor 
eye contact, lack of facial expressions, and/or atypical body language, such as difficulties 
using gestures appropriately (APA, 2013).  
The second diagnostic domain outlines the restricted and repetitive patterns of 
behavior, interests, or activities observed in individuals on the autism spectrum (APA, 
2013). An ASD diagnosis requires the presence of at least two of the following four 
characteristics: (a) stereotyped/repetitive motor movements, speech and/or use of objects 
(e.g., simple motor stereotypies, echolalia); (b) insistence on sameness and anxiety 
around change, rigidity to specific routines, or ritualistic patterns of speech or nonverbal 
behavior (e.g., extreme distress at small changes, difficulties with transitions); (c) 
restrictions due to being engrossed by their interests, which are abnormal in intensity or 
focus (e.g., strong attachment to or preoccupation with unusual objects, excessively 
circumscribed or perseverative interests); and (d) hyperactivity or hypoactivity in their 
relationship with sensory input (e.g., aversion to specific sounds or textures in the 
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environment, apparent indifference to pain/temperature) (APA, 2013; Wozniak, 
Leezenbaum, Northrup, West, & Iverson, 2016). 
In addition to the two primary diagnostic domains pertaining to deficits in social 
communication and interaction and restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests or 
activities, individuals must meet three additional criteria within the DSM-5 to be 
diagnosed with ASD (APA, 2013). Firstly, these symptoms must be present in the 
individual early in development, typically recognized during the second year of life, 
however, it is possible that the disorder may not fully manifest until later in life when the 
individual does not have the capacities or abilities to deal with current social demands 
(APA, 2013; Lauristen, 2013). Secondly, ASD symptoms must cause clinically 
significant difficulties, challenges, and impairments in important areas of functioning, 
such as in social or occupational aspects of one’s life (APA, 2013; Cederlund, Hagberg, 
Billstedt, Gillberg, & Gillberg, 2008). And finally, the symptoms that the individual is 
experiencing must not be better explained by an intellectual disability or global 
developmental delay (APA, 2013). Along with giving an individual the diagnosis of 
ASD, the clinician, such as a psychologist or psychiatrist, must also specify if the 
individual does or does not have an accompanying intellectual or language impairment, 
related medical or genetic condition, environmental factor, or neurodevelopmental, 
mental or behavioral disorder, and if catatonia is present (APA, 2013). 
 ASD symptomatology will often be observable throughout the lifetime, causing 
continuous impairment in important areas of functioning (Wozniak et al., 2016). 
Fortunately, however, ASD is not degenerative and, with effective intervention, 
individuals may be able to improve their life outcomes (e.g., Corbett et al., 2013; 
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Derosier, Swick, Davis, McMillen, & Mathews, 2010). Many individuals with ASD 
develop supports and compensatory coping strategies that assist them with their social 
and emotional struggles in specific contexts as they age (Howlin, 2000). As an example, 
some individuals with HFASD may learn to supress repetitive behaviour in public (APA, 
2013). However, these individuals tend to be at increased risk of developing anxiety or 
depressive disorders (Simonoff et al., 2008). Consequently, early intervention addressing 
emotional and social difficulties associated with ASD, as well as coping skills for 
possible comorbid disorders, is crucial to long-term success (Howlin, 2000; Tidmarsh & 
Volkmar, 2003). 
High-functioning ASD (HFASD). With the fifth edition of the DSM, the 
category of ASD replaced previously used categories, such as pervasive developmental 
disorder and Asperger’s syndrome (APA, 2000; APA, 2013). In the fourth edition of the 
DSM, Asperger’s syndrome was differentiated from autistic disorder by an average to 
above average intelligence and often typically developing speech and language abilities. 
In comparison, those with autistic disorder often display language delays and present with 
below average intelligence (APA, 2000). Similarly, HFASD has been the term used for 
individuals with ASD who do not have intellectual or language impairments. 
Additionally, the DSM-V states that individuals who had a well-established diagnosis of 
autistic disorder, Asperger’s disorder, or pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise 
specified from the DSM-IV before the changes were made should be given the diagnosis 
of autism spectrum disorder (APA, 2013). Thus, those that previously were diagnosed 
with Asperger syndrome have been referred to as having HFASD.  
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For these high functioning individuals, a higher level of cognitive ability and a 
lack of underdeveloped receptive and expressive language abilities often draws a much 
greater focus to their social competence challenges (Lopata et al., 2008). The major focus 
of the deficits of HFASD can be seen in their social interaction and communication skills, 
being that they often do not experience intellectual deficits. These individuals may be 
able to live and work independently and possibly find a niche that matches their special 
interests and skills, however, they typically remain socially naïve and face challenges 
with the practical demands of trying to ‘fit in’ to an ever-changing society (APA, 2013; 
Howlin, 2000). Longitudinal studies have suggested that around 74% of individuals with 
HFASD will have fair to good long-term outcomes, suggesting that a large majority of 
these individuals are able to live independently and function successfully in other areas of 
life (Cederlund et al., 2008). Although the rate of individuals with HFASD who have 
positive long-term outcomes is relatively high compared to individuals on the autism 
spectrum who have an intellectual or verbal impairment, it is crucial that researchers 
continue to investigate the efficacy of current early intervention strategies in order to 
continue to improve these outcome statistics. Examining individuals with HFASD who 
are in late adolescence will likely offer some insight regarding how these early 
interventions affect individuals who are still young enough that they may have not yet 
developed compensation mechanisms to succeed socially. One of the most common foci 
of early interventions for this population is the concept of theory of mind, as increasing 
this ability is thought to improve social functioning (Hofmann et al., 2016), and may 
consequently ease the transition into adulthood for these adolescents. 
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Theory of Mind 
Individuals with a developed theory of mind understand that people have different 
mental states, such as thoughts, perceptions, emotions, beliefs and intentions (Flavell, 
2004; Wellman, 2014). Thus, well-developed theory of mind abilities allow for increased 
insight into the perspective of others, and ultimately to greater social success. The phrase 
“theory of mind” was coined by Premack and Woodruff (1978) in their seminal study 
regarding whether chimpanzees could accurately match a picture of a human actor 
struggling with a problem to the picture that displayed an appropriate solution. To solve 
the problems, chimpanzees had to understand the actor’s purpose, thereby demonstrating 
that primates have a theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This study was the 
first to make the assumption that this ability to recognize and understand another 
individual’s thoughts, wants, beliefs, and other mental states played an important role in 
anticipating and predicting the behaviour of others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). As a 
result, these individuals are able to read other individuals more successfully in social 
situations. 
Wimmer and Perner (1983) were the first known researchers to explore the 
concept of theory of mind in children. Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) young participants 
(who ranged in age from three to nine years) participated in false belief tests to examine 
their theory of mind. False-belief tests measure one’s ability to recognize that another 
person holds an inaccurate belief, an ability that requires theory of mind (Hofmann et al., 
2016). A false belief test is typically presented as a scenario in which a character (e.g., 
puppet) knows where an object (e.g., marble) is located and when the puppet is absent, 
the object is moved without the character’s knowledge. The participant is asked by the 
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researchers where the character in the story will look for the object upon their return 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Understanding that the individual in the story will look in the 
place that the object was when they last saw it, and not where it has been moved, requires 
a developed theory of mind to understand the character’s false belief. These tests are 
commonly used to examine one’s theory of mind because they require the individual to 
take the perspective of the character in the story. By the age of three or four, typically 
developing children are usually able to successfully complete false belief tests (Wimmer 
& Perner, 1983).  
 A landmark study by Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) demonstrated that 
children with ASD struggle with false belief understanding, and tend to have impaired 
theory of mind. These individuals seem to lack the understanding that others have 
different beliefs than themselves, which subsequently weakens their ability to predict the 
behaviour of others (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). The deficits seen in theory of mind in 
individuals with ASD appear to be unrelated to intellectual abilities, as the impairment 
seems to be present in individuals with ASD regardless of his or her intelligence quotient 
(IQ) (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Thus, those with HFASD, who have intellectual abilities 
within the average range, are not exempt from deficits in their theory of mind abilities 
(Montgomery et al., 2012). 
Social importance of theory of mind. As an incredibly important cognitive 
developmental milestone, theory of mind highlights the progression and growth of a 
child’s abilities in social interaction, communication, and understanding (Repacholi & 
Slaughter, 2003). With a theory of mind, children are able to not only understand the 
mental states of others, but also use this understanding to console, cooperate, and 
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coordinate their behaviour with the desires and beliefs of others (Astington, 2003; Miller, 
2009). Theory of mind positively mediates success in communication, as an 
understanding of the communicative partner’s mental state allows the individual to 
communicate in a manner that takes into account the partner’s knowledge or perspective, 
which consequently helps the partner to interpret the communication appropriately 
(Sergienko & Ulanova, 2016). Additionally, those with a more developed theory of mind 
have also been viewed more positively among their peers (Slaughter, Imuta, Peterson, & 
Henry, 2015). Individuals who can relate to their peers through shared beliefs and 
respond appropriately tend to be more likely to develop and maintain friendships. In sum, 
theory of mind allows one to analyze and predict success in everyday social interaction 
(Wellman, 1990). Without the abilities of theory of mind, important aspects of an 
individual’s social interactions are frequently quite challenging, as is often the case for 
individuals with HFASD.  
Another social behaviour that is associated with theory of mind development is 
lying. Lying often occurs as a result of a self-benefiting aim, such as avoiding 
punishment or trying to obtain a reward (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 
1996). Lying is directly related to theory of mind, as the individual must infer the mental 
state of a person they are in communication with and use this information to determine if 
there will be a negative personal consequence if they choose to tell the truth (Talwar, 
Gordon, & Lee, 2007). To lie successfully, individuals must use this knowledge of their 
own, as well as the other individual’s mental state to construct and produce false 
statements (Talwar et al., 2007). Without theory of mind, individuals would not 
understand that the other person is able to hold false beliefs, as discussed previously. 
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Indeed, helping young children to develop a theory of mind also results in the 
development of the ability to lie (Ding, Wellman, Wang, Fu, & Lee, 2015). Specifically, 
the more developed an individual’s theory of mind, the more likely they are to engage in 
self-benefiting lying (Fu, Sai, Yuan, & Lee, 2017). Along with the aim of deceiving, this 
theory of mind development can also be used to manipulate others’ mental states with the 
aim of teasing (Miller, 2009). Thus, theory of mind abilities can be used in many 
everyday life situations, under both adaptive or maladaptive pretenses, such as with the 
intent of building healthy relationships versus the intent to purposefully deceive another 
individual for personal benefit. While theory of mind interventions are not aimed at 
increasing lying abilities in those with HFASD, not understanding the purpose of a small 
lie, friendly teasing, or other types of more subtle communication that are not truthful 
may place individuals with HFASD at a social disadvantage, relative to their typically 
developing peers (Loukusa & Moilanen, 2009). For example, abstaining from telling a 
friend a harsh truth to protect their feelings may be a form of deception that is typically 
seen as socially acceptable, a concept which some individuals with HFASD may not 
understand. 
The crucial component that theory of mind contributes to social interactions can 
be seen in Hofmann and colleagues (2016) study that aimed to improve their participants’ 
theory of mind skills. This research was done with typically developing children, and 
suggests that theory of mind training procedures are effective in improving children’s 
theory of mind skills, across both age and gender (Hofmann et al., 2016). Aspects of the 
theory of mind training that were helpful were corrective feedback, modeling, use of 
imagination, and role-play (Hofmann et al., 2016). Typical theory of mind interventions 
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often last around 15–20 minutes and are done in an individual format (Hofmann et al., 
2016). Thus, these interventions are generally not time-consuming, could potentially be 
implemented in a one-to-one school counsellor setting, and have shown positive 
preliminary results. 
 Research exploring the effects of theory of mind training on individuals with 
HFASD has been less promising. While it is possible to teach children with ASD to have 
success with tasks concerning the emotions and beliefs of others, they do not consistently 
demonstrate advances in social communication skills (Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin, & 
Hill, 1997). These children were able to provide direct answers to direct questions, but 
still experienced social communication impairments, as evidenced by their struggles to 
develop conversation to any significant degree despite the training (Hadwin et al., 1997). 
While individuals with ASD are often capable of understanding the theoretical principles 
of mental state reasoning, they frequently still fail to apply these theoretical principles to 
their day-to-day social interactions, which highlights a discrepancy between knowledge 
and application within this population (Begeer et al., 2011; Scheeren, Rosnay, Koot, & 
Begeer, 2012). Additionally, these individuals often did not experience improvement in 
self-reported empathic skills, such as appropriate emotional reactions, or social behaviour 
as reported by parents, which includes appropriate behavioural expressions and an 
understanding of social information (Begeer et al., 2011). Although this research was 
conducted with individuals with ASD, it highlights the challenges that individuals with 
HFASD face. Individuals with HFASD are often able to cognitively comprehend 
concepts, yet they encounter challenges when attempting to apply their knowledge of 
these concepts to succeed in their social world (APA, 2013). Therefore, the goal of 
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increasing the social abilities of individuals with HFASD exclusively through theory of 
mind training appears somewhat simplistic in light of the complex social and emotional 
needs that individuals on the autism spectrum have.  
Theory of mind in HFASD. As mentioned previously, the social difficulties that 
individuals with HFASD experience are not related to general cognitive abilities, but 
instead stem from underdeveloped social cognition competencies (Ziv, Hadad, Khateeb, 
& Terkel-Dawer, 2014). In terms of difficulties experienced in social interaction and 
communicative impairments, deficits in theory of mind may be the underlying concern 
(Hoogenhout & Malcolm-Smith, 2014). Specifically, the social information processing 
abilities that are inherent in a mature theory of mind may be underdeveloped (Mazza et 
al., 2017). Consequently, the difficulties with theory of mind that individuals with 
HFASD face are not related to an individual’s level of intelligence (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985), but rather to insufficient social behaviour and poor communication skills (Ziv et 
al., 2014). Being that these social challenges in social communication are central to the 
experience of an individual with ASD, theory of mind impairments affect many 
individuals with ASD, including those who are high functioning (Hoogenhout & 
Malcolm-Smith, 2014). The HFASD population allows us to look specifically at the 
social information processing deficits without the extraneous factors that may come from 
comorbid diagnoses, such as global intellectual deficits. Thus, examining theory of mind 
deficits in individual’s with HFASD allows for a clearer picture of the underlying 
mechanism behind the social difficulties.  
Hypotheses surrounding low levels of theory of mind in HFASD. There are 
two major hypotheses that attempt to explain the course of the development of theory of 
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mind in those with ASD, which includes those with HFASD. The first is that the 
development of theory of mind is delayed, and the second is that it is a pervasive deficit 
that is seen across the lifespan (Hoogenhout & Malcolm-Smith, 2014).  
The developmental delay hypothesis suggests that theory of mind abilities have 
the same developmental trajectory and order as in typical development, however, this 
occurs at a later chronological and mental age (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Holroyd & Baron-
Cohen, 1993). The delay hypothesis stems from research that suggests that although most 
individuals with ASD fail false belief tasks, a significant amount of them are able to have 
success on these tests (Happe & Frith, 1996). Importantly, however, the individuals with 
ASD who are able to pass false belief tasks are typically older and have more developed 
verbal abilities than their otherwise comparable counterparts who struggle with these type 
of tasks (Fisher et al., 2005; Happe & Frith, 1996; Hoogenhout & Malcolm-Smith, 2014). 
Similar research has supported this finding, as theory of mind appears to be positively 
correlated with an individual’s age, verbal abilities, and general reasoning abilities 
(Scheeren, Rosnay, Kooy, & Begeer, 2013), and consequently, improvements in theory of 
mind are observed when these three factors are increased. Additionally, it has been 
suggested that all individuals with ASD who have the verbal intellectual abilities 
consistent with those observed in a typically developing child that is 11 years and 9 
months of age are able to pass simple false belief tasks (Happe, 1995). Therefore, this 
theory seems to propose that as individuals with ASD or HFASD age and their verbal and 
general reasoning abilities increase, their theory of mind will continue to improve in a 
similar developmental trajectory as those that are typically developing. 
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The aforementioned hypothesis has been criticized however, which lead to the 
opposing hypothesis of theory of mind development that focuses on a pervasive deficit 
(Hoogenhout & Malcolm-Smith, 2014). An example of the criticism of the delayed 
hypothesis can be seen in Holroyd and Baron-Cohen’s (1993) study in which they found 
that even after 7-8 years of testing using false belief tasks, there was no statistical change 
in theory of mind levels. The authors found that overall, 82.4% of individuals with ASD 
demonstrated identical performance at the start and end of the longitudinal study 
(Holroyd & Baron-Cohen, 1993). They concluded that the majority of individuals with 
ASD will experience little development of theory of mind, as only a small minority 
appear to develop the equivalent of a three- to four-year-old level by adolescence, and 
abilities consistent with a typically developing six or seven-year-old in adulthood 
(Holroyd & Baron-Cohen, 1993). These results indicate that there may be a ceiling effect 
in theory of mind development in those with ASD and HFASD, which therefore suggests 
that the deficits in theory of mind may be caused by an atypical developmental trajectory 
in which potentials are reached in childhood, rather than a delay (Hoogenhout & 
Malcolm-Smith, 2014). Another argument for a developmental deficit is that theory of 
mind often does not follow the trajectory of development in typically developing 
individuals that was previously proposed, as in those with ASD it has been seen to 
regress or fluctuate in some individuals (Burack & Volkmar, 1992; Serra, Loth, van 
Geert, Hurkens, & Minderaa, 2002). Some have proposed, however, that the development 
of theory of mind may involve both a delayed and truncated development, as both have 
been supported in the literature (Hoogenhout & Malcolm-Smith, 2014; Serra et al., 2002). 
More specifically, perhaps not all individuals with ASD will develop an effective theory 
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of mind, and in the small number of individuals that do progress in the development of 
their theory of mind abilities, their development progress is slower and may plateau in 
childhood, and thus, may follow a unique developmental trajectory that differs from 
typically developing individuals (Hoogenhout & Malcolm-Smith, 2014).  
Emotional Intelligence 
Without question, intelligence plays a significant role in an individual’s success 
throughout life. Importantly however, the intelligence quotient cannot account for all of 
the performance variance on measures of social and emotional functioning, such as 
effectively maintaining social relationships (Beldoch, 1962; Cherniss, 2010). Emotional 
intelligence is a stronger predictor of social success than traditional cognitive intelligence 
(Goleman, 2005). Salovey and Mayer (1990) initially proposed this novel type of 
intelligence as the ability to understand and monitor the emotions of oneself and others, 
and consequently use this information to inform thoughts and behaviours. The current 
literature regarding emotional intelligence stems from two related, but distinct 
approaches: the ability approach and the trait approach.  
According to Mayer and Salovey (1997), ability-based emotional intelligence is 
the mental ability involved in information processing. Proponents of ability-based 
emotional intelligence suggest that there are certain performance criteria that have a level 
of correctness, thus the abilities in emotional intelligence can be separated into good and 
bad or better and worse (Brackett, Rivers, & Salovey, 2011). The branches of the ability-
based model include abilities to perceive emotions, apply emotions to facilitate thought, 
comprehend emotions, and manage emotions (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008; Mayer 
& Salovey, 1997). While distinct from other models of traditional cognitive intelligence, 
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the branches of emotional intelligence are interrelated, and tend to increase with age and 
experience (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999). The ability-based model of intelligence 
involves emotion-related abilities that are typically measured in performance-based 
assessment (Petrides, Pita, & Kokkinaki, 2007).  
The trait-based model of emotional intelligence was developed by Bar-On (1997) 
and is used to define and assess what has been termed the emotional quotient. Trait-based 
emotional intelligence, or the emotional quotient, is thought of as a collection of non-
cognitive skills, capabilities, and competencies that play a role in an individual’s ability 
to succeed in their social environment (Bar-On, 1997). Non-cognitive dispositional 
tendencies and perceptions of oneself are considered personality traits, rather than 
cognitive abilities (Petrides et al., 2007). This model classifies emotional intelligence into 
five general quotients: intrapersonal (self-awareness, independence, self-actualization), 
interpersonal (social responsibility, empathy), adaptability (problem-solving abilities, 
flexibility, reality-testing), stress management (stress tolerance, impulse management), 
and general mood (happiness, optimism) (Bar-On, 1997). Unlike ability-based emotional 
intelligence, which is measured through performance-based testing, trait-based emotional 
intelligence is a measure of emotion-related dispositions and self-perceptions examined 
through self-reported assessments (Petrides et al., 2007).  
 Social importance of emotional intelligence. Research suggests that a maturely 
developed emotional intelligence helps promote positive social functioning, as it allows 
individuals to recognize the emotional states of others and understand their unique 
perspective (Brackett et al., 2011). The relationship between high levels of emotional 
intelligence and the increased accuracy in perceiving variations in others’ mood suggests 
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that emotion perception is essential for social adaptation (Engelberg & Sjoberg, 2004). 
Additionally, emotional intelligence enhances social communication skills and allows for 
regulation of social behaviour (Brackett et al., 2011; Goleman, 2005). The ability to react 
to emotional information in ways that are well-suited for the social environment is likely 
to assist the individual in increasing the success they experience in interpersonal 
relationships. 
Emotional intelligence includes the ability to monitor and understand not only the 
emotions of others, but also one’s own emotions (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Emotional 
dysregulation is the failure to understand and regulate emotions appropriately, an 
experience that tends to be common for individuals with ASD (Samson, Phillips, Parker, 
Shah, Gross, & Hardan, 2014). This aspect of emotional intelligence has shown to be 
linked to deficits in social communication (Samson et al., 2014), as inappropriate 
emotional responses often have a negative impact on social interactions. Individuals with 
HFASD tend to have difficulty recognizing and understanding their own emotions, and 
they struggle even more so with understanding the emotions of others. Research suggests 
that individuals with ASD have significant impairments in recognizing a variety of 
emotions in other people through a variety of mediums, such as viewing an individual’s 
facial expressions, hearing an emotionally-laden tone of voice, or watching a body 
movement that is meant to display an emotion, such as an angry body posture (e.g., 
clenched fists, tensed shoulders; Phillip et al., 2010). These findings suggest that 
underdeveloped emotional intelligence is present throughout different modalities of 
communication. Underdeveloped emotional recognition has also been correlated with 
difficulties making social judgements, such as the level of approachability others exhibit, 
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using facial information (Phillip et al., 2010). Thus, the challenges individuals with 
HFASD face when trying to understand, monitor, and regulate the emotions of 
themselves and others often contribute to their difficulties interacting with others. The 
cumulative effect of being unable to determine the emotion of a communicative partner 
and being unsure how to respond with appropriate emotion is likely to make social 
interactions especially distressing situations for these individuals. 
Although there is limited evidence to suggest a significant correlation between the 
trait-based and ability-based models of emotional intelligence, these models both 
contribute important insight in efforts to predict social outcomes throughout the lifespan 
for typically developing individuals (Boily et al., 2017). Children with high levels of 
trait-based emotional intelligence were noted to have exhibited more cooperation and 
leadership, and less disruptive, aggressive, and dependent behaviour, as rated by their 
peers (Petrides et al., 2006). In young adults, higher trait-based emotional intelligence has 
been associated with lower levels of stress, depression, and anxiety when facing daily life 
pressures (Martins, Ramalho, & Morin, 2010). Trait emotional intelligence has also been 
related to successful social interactions (Lopes et al., 2004) and prosocial behaviours 
(Frederickson, Petrides, & Simmonds, 2012). Emotional intelligence is positively 
correlated with self-confidence, behaviour intended to benefit another person, and social 
competence in general (Marquez, Martin, & Brackett, 2006).  Individuals with high levels 
of ability-based emotional intelligence were also more likely to report positive 
interactions with others, higher levels of extraversion, a greater competence of managing 
one’s emotions appropriately, and ultimately more positive social outcomes in their 
relationships with others (Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2003). Furthermore, emotional 
  
  
23 
intelligence is believed to be positively associated with the amount of social support and 
the extent of satisfaction with social support (Ciarrochi, Chang & Bajgar, 2001).  
While ability-based emotional intelligence positively affects mental health 
through the flexible selection of coping strategies, trait-based emotional intelligence 
comparatively affects the effectiveness of coping (Davis & Humphrey, 2012). This means 
that high levels of trait-based emotional intelligence increase the beneficial effects of 
active coping and decreases the effects of avoidant coping, which consequently helps 
reduce ASD symptomatology (Davis & Humphrey, 2012). The ability to effectively cope 
also has a broader impact on social interactions through more appropriate and effective 
responses to emotional stimuli, which can ultimately help build emotional bonds and 
promote as well as strengthen relationships. Overall, emotional intelligence is 
theoretically and empirically related to social success (Ferguson & Austin, 2010), and 
both trait-based and ability-based are associated with social capabilities (Brackett, Rivers, 
Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 2006; Mavroveli, Petrides, Rieffe, & Bakker, 2007).  
Emotional intelligence in HFASD. Along with theory of mind, emotional 
intelligence is also directly linked to the social difficulties faced by individuals with 
HFASD. Many of the various aspects of emotional intelligence may be difficult for these 
individuals, such as perceiving and recognizing their own and others’ emotions, 
understanding what these emotions mean, and appropriately responding to such emotions 
(Petrides, Hudry, Michalaria, Swami, & Sevdalis, 2011). Additionally, emotional 
intelligence difficulties may also relate to how individuals with HFASD engage in facial 
recognition. Compared to typically developing individuals who use emotional 
intelligence to identify emotional facial expressions (Ciarrochi et al., 2001), those with 
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HFASD face challenges in this area. While individuals with ASD or HFASD tend to be 
quite capable of expert face processing abilities (Joseph & Tanaka, 2003; Lahaie et al., 
2006; Nishimura, Rutherford, & Maurer, 2008), they struggle with inferring emotional 
components of faces, such as recognizing that a clenched mouth and furrowed eyebrows 
may suggest anger, especially as the emotional inferences increase in complexity (Walsh, 
Creighton, & Rutherford, 2016). As mentioned above, these individuals also have 
difficulties identifying emotions by viewing body movement and vocal tone (Philip et al., 
2010), suggesting that there may be a generalized impairment in emotion recognition.  
When examining the challenges these individuals face in understanding and 
appropriately responding to emotions, it is helpful to look at the previously described trait 
and ability models of emotional intelligence. The trait and ability models both offer 
distinct conceptualizations of emotional intelligence, and as such, both can be applied to 
those with HFASD in different ways. Ability emotional intelligence is thought to be a 
mental ability and involved in information processing, and thus may relate to how 
individuals with HFASD cognitively manage emotional content and how they reason 
with emotional information in social situations (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Montgomery et 
al., 2010). Trait emotional intelligence, conversely, is related to one’s personality and 
may relate to how individuals with HFASD perceive their general performance and 
competencies in social interaction (Bar-On, 1997; Montgomery et al., 2010). Individuals 
with HFASD struggle significantly with trait emotional intelligence, however, their 
ability emotional intelligence levels remain largely intact (Montgomery et al., 2010; 
Petrides et al., 2011). Thus, those with HFASD showed impairment in emotional 
intelligence characteristics and performance in real-life emotion-laden communication, 
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yet were able to process emotional information (Montgomery et al., 2010; Montgomery 
et al., 2012). Emotional intelligence is distinct from an individual’s intelligence, as 
individuals with HFASD who have largely intact language and cognitive abilities still 
struggle with understanding and using emotions (Petrides et al., 2011). Therefore, 
individuals with HFASD may be able to use their cognitive abilities as a compensatory 
strategy to decode and reason with emotions and how they relate to behaviour, as they 
have difficulty making sense of emotional processing. They face challenges, however, 
when it comes to their actual social interactions that involve applying their knowledge to 
these real-life emotional exchanges (Montgomery et al., 2012). As a result, early 
interventions aimed at improving these individual’s trait emotional intelligence could 
have lasting, positive outcomes in the lives of individuals with HFASD. These 
interventions are crucial to bridge the gap between social and emotional knowledge, and 
the practical abilities and skills required to apply this knowledge, and to apply it flexibly 
to improve social outcomes for individuals with HFASD. Understanding the difference in 
trait emotional intelligence in those with HFASD relative to their typically developing 
peers allows researchers and practitioners a more comprehensive understanding of how 
early intervention can ultimately promote increased positive social outcomes that also 
exhibit applicability across home, school, and community settings, as well as longevity 
throughout the life span.  
Theory of mind and emotional intelligence. Even though theory of mind and 
emotional intelligence both contribute to successful social interactions through an 
understanding of the thoughts, feelings, and ultimately perspectives of others, they are 
distinct constructs (Blair, 2002). As an example, the conceptual link between theory of 
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mind and emotional intelligence can be seen in emotion perception, emotional 
understanding and managing the emotions of others (Ferguson & Austin, 2010). 
Correlational studies have supported this, as theory of mind and emotional intelligence 
have shown to have a positive statistical relationship (Barlow, Qualter, & Styliano, 2010). 
Further, these concepts are also positively associated with increased social competence in 
typically developing individuals (Liddle & Nettle, 2006). However, the differences 
between these concepts can be seen when comparing theory of mind to the emotional 
intelligence components of self-esteem, emotional regulation of oneself, and motivation 
(Ferguson & Austin, 2010). As mentioned previously, theory of mind is related to 
understanding the mental states of others (Flavell, 2004), whereas emotional intelligence 
not only involves similar interpersonal abilities, but also intrapersonal aspects as well, 
such as regulating one’s own emotions, managing one’s stress levels, and one’s general 
mood (Bar-On, 1997). Therefore, although both of these concepts include recognizing 
emotions in other individuals, emotional intelligence may have a greater application to 
how an individual actually functions in an emotional context. For example, an individual 
may have satisfactory abilities in controlling his or her own emotions, but that does not 
mean that he or she has the ability to understand the emotions and mental states of others. 
This example may be relevant to individuals with HFASD, as they may have higher 
functioning emotional intelligence than theory of mind (Blair, 2002). This highlights the 
social difficulties that those with HFASD face. Additionally, theory of mind has aspects 
that are not related to emotional intelligence, as this ability involves not only 
understanding and inferring the emotions of others, but also includes all other types of 
mental states, such as desires, beliefs, and intentions (Ferguson & Austin, 2010). An 
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example of the disconnect between these concepts can be seen in individuals with 
psychopathy, as they often have significant deficits in emotional intelligence, however 
their theory of mind is much more intact (Dolan & Fullam, 2004; Richell et al., 2003). 
This may affect their ability to understand their own and others emotions, even though 
they may be able to predict other mental states of others. Thus, theory of mind and 
emotional intelligence often overlap, but it is not necessary to have one in order to have 
the other (Blair, 2002).   
Social Stress in HFASD 
 The difficulties that individuals with HFASD face in social settings not only 
contribute to poor social experiences and outcomes, but also to chronic, significant levels 
of social stress that continuously impede their social abilities. Higher levels of cognitive 
intelligence appear to negatively impact the level of social stress, as it often provides 
increased insight into their social challenges (Frith, 2004). Unlike children with ASD 
who often overestimate their social competence, children with HFASD tend to be aware 
of the difficulties they face and see themselves as less socially competent (Vickerstaff et 
al., 2007). This ability to perceive their own social difficulties often causes significant 
comorbid emotional struggles, such as lower happiness and self-esteem (Petrides et al., 
2011).  
Compared to typically developing individuals, those with HFASD experience a 
higher level of perceived stress, as well as significantly more stressful life events 
(Bishop-Fitzpatrick, Minshew, Mazefsky, & Eack, 2017). An increased level of stress in 
general has negative consequences for these individuals, as it has shown to be 
significantly associated with social disability (Bishop-Fitzpatrick et al., 2017). Increased 
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stress also causes physiological reactions, such as systolic blood pressure reactivity 
(Bishop-Fitzpatrick et al., 2017). Unfortunately for those with HFASD, stress may 
precipitate and/or exacerbate the core symptoms of HFASD (Khor, Melvin, Reid & Gray, 
2014). Additionally, high stress levels have been associated with symptoms of anxiety in 
adults with HFASD (Gillott & Standen, 2007). Thus, it seems that these individuals are at 
a higher risk of experiencing significant levels of long-term stress, potentially related, at 
least in part, to their increased insight into their social deficits relative to other individuals 
on the spectrum. Additionally, they are also further disadvantaged by this heightened 
stress exacerbating their social challenges, consequently leaving them at a high risk to 
develop a comorbid mood disorder, such as anxiety or depression. Interventions targeting 
stress management in adolescence may improve the long-term social functioning of 
people with HFASD, as well as their overall quality of life.  
Impact of Theory of Mind and Emotional Intelligence on Social Stress in 
those with HFASD. Many interventions aimed at improving the social abilities of 
children and adolescents with HFASD focus on increasing their theory of mind. Theory 
of mind is targeted in this population based on previous findings that suggest increasing 
theory of mind in typically developing children leads to greater success in social 
situations (Ferguson & Austin, 2010; Hofmann, 2016; Liddle & Nettle, 2006). However, 
developing a theory of mind may not aid the development of social skills in individuals 
who have HFASD and may in fact hinder this process. It appears that increasing theory of 
mind abilities while emotional intelligence remains underdeveloped predicts high levels 
of social stress in individuals with HFASD (Montgomery et al., 2012). Taken together, 
impaired theory of mind and low emotional intelligence predict about a third of the social 
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stress experienced by individuals with HFASD (Montgomery et al., 2012). Thus, it 
appears that when these abilities are underdeveloped, it may lead to social stress in those 
with HFASD. However, if theory of mind is further developed without concurrently 
further developing emotional intelligence, social stress is also significantly increased. It is 
therefore speculated that if these individuals on the autism spectrum are not exposed to 
interventions that both target theory of mind and emotional intelligence concurrently, 
they may be at a higher risk of experiencing significant social stress, and ultimately 
predisposed to a higher risk of developing a comorbid disorder. 
Effective social communication requires more than the cognitive components of 
theory of mind. Effective socializing requires both being able to understand what is 
happening in the situation you are in, while simultaneously using one’s emotional 
intelligence skills to appropriately respond (Petrides et al., 2011). As discussed above, 
individuals with HFASD have a higher level of the cognitive aspect of communication 
relative to their ability to apply this knowledge and ultimately experience success in 
social situations (Petrides et al., 2011). The cognitive component of emotional interaction 
can be comparable to theory of mind within these individuals, as it involves a cognitive 
understanding of how another person is feeling or thinking. Thus, increasing one’s 
cognitive understanding of other’s thoughts and feelings without also increasing the 
practical knowledge and skills regarding the application of the increased understanding of 
others, may unfortunately increase social stress. These individuals may better understand 
what is occurring in the social situation, but not know how to appropriately respond or 
react, as they may not have the social or emotional skills to do so. This combination of 
knowledge without the social and emotional skills to respond can be extremely stressful, 
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particularly when surrounded by peers (Humphrey & Lewis, 2008). The combination of a 
high level of theory of mind and a low level of emotional intelligence may allow the 
individual with HFASD to better recognize when their peers have negative perceptions 
and evaluations of them. Furthermore, the stress is amplified in these individuals without 
the ability to appropriately and successfully respond to these negative evaluations. 
Amplified stress and lack of ability to respond can create a cycle where the individual 
knows others are negatively appraising them, causing them to react in a socially 
inappropriate way (Khor et al., 2014), which subsequently causes their peers to 
negatively evaluate them further. This unfortunate sequence of events highlights the 
immense importance of providing interventions that not only address theory of mind in 
individuals with HFASD, but concurrently aim to further develop emotional intelligence 
as well, so these individuals can apply their increased understanding of other’s 
perspective into how they respond, with the ultimate aim being to increase successful 
social communication.    
 Elevated social stress levels may affect social interventions for those with 
HFASD. The elevated levels of stress in those with HFASD may compromise their 
capacity to employ the strategies that they are learning in interventions (Bishop-
Fitzpatrick et al., 2017), such as those that attempt to heighten theory of mind and 
emotional intelligence. Therefore, these interventions that are designed to lower stress 
may not only unintentionally raise it, but also may be compounded by the already present 
level of stress that is common in this population. Heightened stress levels are likely to 
decrease the efficacy of interventions and may ultimately heighten social stress levels 
even further (Bishop-Fitzpatrick et al., 2017).  
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 In sum, current interventions for individuals with HFASD are aimed at increasing 
theory of mind with the goal of increasing social competence, and thus decreasing social 
stress. Importantly however, the relationship between theory of mind and social 
competence and stress is not fully understood in individuals with HFASD. It appears that 
methods to increase social competence in those that are typically developing are being 
used with those with HFASD without a comprehensive understanding of how their needs 
may differ from those in typically developing populations. It is understood that those with 
HFASD experience a deficit in theory of mind and emotional intelligence (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985; Boily et al., 2017). Previous research has shown that interventions aimed at 
increasing these concepts separately in typically developing individuals are successful in 
increasing social competence (Ferguson & Austin, 2010), so this is being applied to 
HFASD individuals as well. The current interventions that target theory of mind without 
concurrently improving emotional intelligence, however, may not be the most effective 
way to improve outcomes for those with HFASD, and as mentioned above, may 
unintentionally worsen their social experiences by increasing social stress. Examining 
and comparing the interaction between theory of mind, emotional intelligence, and social 
stress in those with HFASD and typically developing individuals allows for an increased 
understanding of the efficacy of current interventions, and more importantly, ways in 
which researchers and practitioners can improve these interventions.  
Chapter Three: Methods 
 The data used in the current study was previously collected through a larger tri-
university collaboration conducted through the University of Calgary, University of 
Saskatchewan, and University of Manitoba. This broad study had the overarching goal of 
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investigating the emotional and executive functioning of late adolescents with HFASD as 
compared to typically developing individuals, and to consequently use this information to 
help these individuals transition into adulthood (Brady, 2011). This original study was 
approved by the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board, the 
University of Manitoba Psychology/Sociology Research Ethics Board, and the University 
of Calgary Conjoint Faculties Research Ethics Board in the months of May and June of 
2006. Use of the aggregate data from the original study for the purpose of this current 
study was approved by the Human Subjects Research Committee at the University of 
Lethbridge based on the anonymous nature of the data collected in the original study. The 
data from the previous study has been utilized in a unique and new way to examine 
theory of mind, emotional intelligence, and social stress in those with Asperger 
Syndrome/now HFASD. During data collection, Asperger Syndrome was still considered 
a disorder within the DSM-IV, however, these individuals are now considered as falling 
into the newer broader category of ASD (APA, 2000; APA, 2013). The individuals that 
participated in this study would now be reclassified as having ASD with the specifiers of 
without intellectual or language impairments, also known as HFASD (APA, 2013). Thus, 
this research refers to the participants as having HFASD throughout this study, as it is the 
current terminology.   
Participants 
 Participants with HFASD were recruited from schools, university clinics, service 
organization, and mental health settings in Alberta and Manitoba as part of the broader 
project. To understand how the variables of theory of mind, emotional intelligence, and 
social stress interact in those with HFASD, a typically developing control group was used 
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for comparison. Control group participants were recruited through advertisements in local 
newspapers, newsletters, and posters in various service centers and in university 
campuses, and by word of mouth.  There were 35 participants with HFASD recruited that 
met inclusion criteria, described below, who were invited to participate in the study. The 
participants ranged in age from 16.3-21.6 years (M = 18.8, SD = 1.5). The control group 
of age- and sex-matched typically developing individuals also had 35 individuals ranging 
from 16.0 to 21.6 years (M = 18.9, SD = 1.5). The male to female ratio for this study was 
3:1, which is similar to the ratio’s reported in commonly cited work on similar 
information (Ehlers & Gillberg, 1993). Individuals with comorbid conditions were not 
excluded from participating unless their co-existing condition interfered with their ability 
to complete study tasks (e.g., selective mutism).  All research participants provided their 
informed consent prior to being included in the study. 
The inclusionary criteria for this study covered five important areas. The first 
criterion was a clinical diagnosis. To participate in this study, clinical participants for the 
HFASD group had to have received a diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome (HFASD) from a 
medical doctor, psychologist or psychiatrist. It was required that participants provide 
documentation of this diagnosis, the name of the professional who provided the 
diagnosis, and information regarding their developmental history. The next inclusionary 
criterion was validation of diagnosis. Participants from the HFASD group were required 
to produce a classification within the high to very high ranges of likelihood of having 
Asperger Syndrome on the Krug Asperger Disorder Index (KADI; Krug & Arick, 2003). 
This is a measure made to aid in the distinction between individuals with AS/high-
functioning autism. As the data collection was completed prior to the diagnostic change 
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in the current fifth edition of the DSM (APA, 2013), Asperger Syndrome is no longer 
separate from other forms of HFASD. This criterion is still relevant, however, as it helps 
to assess not only intellectual abilities, but also typically-developed language abilities in 
early childhood. Additionally, it also helps to validate social and emotional challenges 
specific to those on the autism spectrum, relative to other clinical populations who also 
struggle socially and emotionally. The next inclusionary criterion was intelligence. The 
HFASD group and the typically developing group participants in this study were required 
to demonstrate verbal IQ, performance/visual IQ, and full-scale intelligence in the 
average or higher ranges on the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; 
Wechsler, 1999). This was meant to ensure the sample met the HFASD criterion of no 
impairment in intellectual abilities. This criterion was important to ensure that the 
variables were not affected below average intellectual ability. The control participants 
were not matched to the HFASD participants on this criterion, as research has shown that 
individuals with HFASD often demonstrate an uneven and uncommon display of 
intellectual abilities. The purpose of the control group was to provide comparison of 
typically developing individuals who do not display ASD intellectual profiles. Next, 
typical early language development was considered a required criterion for inclusion in 
the study. This meant that clinical and control participants must not have experienced a 
language delay in early childhood. Finally, neurological integrity was a criterion to 
participate in this study. Thus, all participants must not have had a history of head injury 
or diagnosis of neurologically-based medical condition (such as a seizure disorder) in 
order to participate.  
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Materials 
 In order to address the two research questions, data was statistically assessed from 
three measures completed by those with HFASD. 
Intelligence. To ensure that participants did not have underdeveloped intellectual 
abilities, the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was 
used. This is an appropriate intelligence test for individuals between the ages eight to 89 
(Wechsler, 1999). The WASI includes four subscales: vocabulary, similarities, block 
design, and matric reasoning (Wechsler, 1999). The psychometric properties of this 
assessment are considered extremely good (Montgomery et al., 2010). Stability 
coefficients indicate high reliability, ranging from .93 to .92 for children and adults 
respectively (Saklofske et al., 2000; Wechsler, 1999). To highlight the validity of the 
WASI, research has shown high correlations between other highly validated intelligence 
assessments, such as the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 3rd Edition (WISC-III; 
Wechsler, 1991) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 3rd Edition (WAIS-III; 
Saklofske et al., 2000; Wechsler, 1997; Wechsler, 1999).  
Autism Spectrum Symptomatology. The Krug Asperger Disorder Index (KADI; 
Krug & Arick, 2003) was used to assess individuals for ASD. This norm referenced 
assessment (ages six to 21) contains 32 items that rate the individual’s behaviour and can 
be completed by close friends, parents, or relatives of the individual (Krug & Arick, 
2003). The internal reliability of the KADI is high at .89, has shown 90% agreement on 
measures of inter-rater reliability, and validity of .94 for specificity, .78 for sensitivity, 
and .83 for predictive power (Krug & Arick, 2003).  
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 Autism Symptomatology Severity. The Gilliam Autism Rating Scale-Second 
Edition (GARS-2: Gilliam, 2006) was also used to screen for ASD. This screening tool 
contains 42 items and was designed for use with individuals between the ages of 3 to 22 
(Gilliam, 2006). The purpose of this assessment is to distinguish between those with ASD 
and those who are typically developing or have severe behavioural disorders 
(Montgomery, Newton, & Smith, 2006). This tool reflects the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) 
understanding of ASD and provides an index of symptom severity. Scores assess 
stereotyped behaviours, communication, and social interaction (Gilliam, 2006). The 
internal consistency of the GARS-2 is high (Montgomery et al., 2006), test-retest is 
significant, and this item appears to be valid comparably to the DSM-IV-TR criteria of 
ASD (Brady, 2011). 
Theory of mind. To measure theory of mind, participants completed the Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes Test, Revised Version (Eyes Test Revised) (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). This assessment is an advanced theory of 
mind test that contains 36 items (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Participants are asked to 
examine black and white pictures of the eye area of a face and choose one of four 
affectual words that best describes the emotion displayed by the eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001). This assessment of theory of mind offers a thorough exploration of theory of mind 
through assessing the cognitive capability of the individual, compared to self-report 
questionnaires that may only examine the self-perception/evaluation (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2015). This instrument has good reliability and validity (Fernandez-Abascal, Cabello, 
Fernandez-Berrocal, & Baron-Cohen, 2013; Vallante et al., 2013).  
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Emotional Intelligence. While trait-based and ability-based conceptions of 
emotional intelligence appear to be similar, correctional analyses have demonstrated that 
the conceptual overlap between the two constructs is quite minimal (O’Connor & Little, 
2003; Warwick & Nettelbeck, 2004). Comparative analyses have suggested that, although 
the trait-based model is quite broad, it has good predictive and explanatory value across 
situations and has a stronger empirical basis than ability-based model (Montgomery et al., 
2012; Petrides, Sangareau, Furnham, & Frederickson, 2006). Thus, this study uses the 
trait-based model of emotional intelligence to measure this concept. To measure trait 
emotional intelligence, individuals completed the Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory-
Short Form (Bar-On EQ-i:S; Bar-On, 2002). This assessment measures the key aspects 
that define emotional intelligence behaviour in individuals 16 years of age or older (Bar-
On, 2002). This is the brief version of the BarOn EQ:I (Bar-On, 1997).  This assessment 
requires participants to rate themselves on a five-point Likert scale that ranges from “very 
seldom true of me” to “very often true of me” on 51 items (Bar-On, 1997). The BarOn 
EQ-i:S assesses four main areas of trait emotional intelligence. The first area it assesses is 
the intrapersonal emotional quotient, which focuses on self-awareness and self-
expression (Bar-On, 2002). Next, it examines interpersonal emotional quotient, which 
includes interpersonal relationships and an individual’s social awareness (Bar-On, 2002). 
The third area is stress management emotional quotient, which measures emotional 
regulation and management (Bar-On, 2002). Finally, this assessment measures 
adaptability emotional quotient, which includes change management abilities (Bar-On, 
2002). Raw scores from these areas are then converted to norm-referenced standard 
scores (M = 100, SD = 15). Internal consistency for this assessment is acceptable, ranging 
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from .70 to .80 (Bar-On, 2002). Additionally, the Bar-On EQ:I and the BarOn EQ-i:S 
have strong correlations, from .73 to .97, which show construct validity in the short 
version (Bar-On, 2002).  
 Social Stress. To assess social stress, participants were asked to complete the 
Behavior Assessment System for Children (2nd ed.; BASC-2; Reynolds & Kamphaus, 
2004) The BASC-2 is a multi-dimensional inventory to assess the behaviour and self-
perceptions of individuals (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004). This assessment was designed 
for use with individuals ranging from two years old to 25 years old. The BASC-2 
includes three rating forms, one to be filled out by the individual, the parent, and the 
teacher (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004). This is beneficial, as it provides multi-source 
information about the individual’s behavioural and affective functioning throughout 
various situations and contexts (Montgomery et al., 2010). There are five components to 
the BASC-2 which stem from these rating forms. This includes the teacher rating scales 
(TRS), the parent rating scales (PRS), the self-report of personality (SRP), the structured 
developmental history (SDH) form, and the student observation system (SOS) (Reynolds 
& Kamphaus, 2004). For this study, the Social Stress scale from the SRP was used. The 
BASC-2 has moderate to good reliability and validity (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004).  
Procedures 
 The individuals who were interested in participating in this research study were 
mailed an information package that outlined the general information surrounding this 
project, consent forms for the participants and their parents, including assent forms, and 
the Participant Information: Developmental History questionnaire for parents to 
complete. Parents of the participants with HFASD were also asked to complete the 
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KADI, which was used to determine if participants met the inclusionary criteria. Once the 
information was completed and returned to the researchers, the parents of minor 
participants and the participants that were over the age of majority were contacted to 
schedule a time for participation in the research study. When participants arrived at the 
research session, they were first given an overview of the research session, a debriefing 
about the measures of the study, a reminder that participation was voluntary and that they 
could withdraw at any time without consequence, and finally a confirmation of assent or 
consent was obtained. Participants from both the HFASD group and the control group 
then completed a battery of measures in one session assessing ASD symptomatology, 
cognitive intelligence, emotional intelligence, executive function, resiliency and 
behaviour as part of the large tri-university study. The participants who completed the 
research tasks of this study were compensated for their time with a fifty-dollar gift 
certificate. Those that did not meet inclusionary criteria were thanked for their time and 
entered into a draw for a prize, which included a pair of binoculars and a USB thumb 
drive. 
Method of Analysis 
 To examine the research question, a multiple linear regression was conducted to 
assess if the independent variables predicted the dependent variable. A multiple linear 
regression analysis evaluates the correlations and interactions between multiple 
interval/ratio predictor variables on an interval/ratio criterion variable and is used when 
the correlations are hypothesized to be linear (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2007). This type of 
analysis is popular due to its versatility and amount of information it reveals regarding 
the relationships among variables, such as both the magnitude and statistical significance 
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of relationships (Gall et al., 2007). In this study, the independent variables were the levels 
of theory of mind and emotional intelligence and the dependent variable was social stress 
levels. The following regression equation was used: ?̂? = 𝑏1𝑋1 +  𝑏2𝑋2 + 𝐶. In this 
equation, Y is the level of social stress, b1 and b2 are the regression weights (a multiplier 
term added to each independent variable to maximize predictive value of the variables) of 
theory of mind and emotional intelligence respectively, and X1 and X2 are the scores of 
the independent variables, thus levels of theory of mind and emotional intelligence 
respectively. Lastly, C is the constant term (Gall et al., 2007). This was completed with 
the data for the group with HFASD, as well as the data from the typically developing 
group.  
 The independent variables were assessed by what they add to the prediction of the 
social stress that is unique from the predictability afforded by the other independent 
variables (Gall et al., 2007). Additionally, an F-test was utilized to evaluate if both 
independent variables collectively predicted the dependent variable. The coefficient of 
determination (R2) was also calculated and used to assess the amount of variance in social 
stress that is explained by an individual’s independent variable or a combination of the 
independent variables (Gall et al., 2007).  
 The assumptions of multiple regression were also assessed. The first assumption 
is that variables are normally distributed. The importance of this is that non-normally 
distributed variables, such as those that are highly skewed or have extreme outliers, may 
distort the relationships between variables and thus the significance of the tests 
(Osbourne & Waters, 2002). The next assumption is that the independent and dependent 
variables have a linear relationship, as this type of statistical analysis can only accurately 
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estimate relationships if they are linear in nature (Osbourne & Waters, 2002). Another 
assumption of multiple regression analysis is that the variables are measured without 
error and are reliable (Osbourne & Waters, 2002). This assumption is important because 
in the situation that variables are unreliably measured, relationships may be under-
estimated which increases the risk of committing a Type II error (Osbourne & Waters, 
2002). The final assumption is of homoscedasticity, which means that the variance of 
errors is equal across all levels of the independent variable (Osbourne & Waters, 2002). 
When the variance of error is scattered differently around the various values of the 
independent variable, this indicates heteroscedasticity which increases the possibility of a 
Type I error (Osbourne & Waters, 2002). Checking all of these assumptions will allow 
the researcher to ensure they are avoiding a Type I and/or II error.  
A one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to identify 
whether diagnosis (HFASD or none) affected an individual’s social stress level, 
emotional intelligence, and theory of mind abilities. Where significant multivariate main 
effects and interactions were found, univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used 
to identify if the dependent variables contributed to the significant multivariate result.  
For all hypotheses, statistical tests were set at an alpha probability of .05.  This ensures 
reasonable assurance against Type I errors as well as consistency in producing power 
statistics for all the tests.  
Chapter Four: Results 
 The purpose of the present study was to expand on previous preliminary findings 
and to investigate the social stress levels of individuals with HFASD, relative to their 
typically developing peers. This chapter first describes the findings of the study and its 
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primary research questions, including an analysis of the descriptive variables, a multiple 
regression analysis, and the MANOVA. The following hypotheses were tested in the 
present study to answer the two research questions: 
1) Theory of mind will be directly related to social stress levels in individuals with 
HFASD. Emotional intelligence will be inversely related to the social stress levels 
in individuals with HFASD. 
Theory of mind and emotional intelligence measure scores will be inversely 
related to social stress levels in typically developing individuals. 
2) Individuals with HFASD will have significantly differently levels of theory of 
mind, emotional intelligence, and social stress scores than those that are typically 
developing.  
Individuals with HFASD will score lower on the theory of mind and emotional 
intelligence scales and higher on the social stress scores compared to their 
typically developing peers. 
Data Screening 
 To ensure all values were entered correctly, all data entry was checked by two 
researchers simultaneously during the initial study. It appeared that some data was 
missing during this check, however, it was available and subsequently entered by both 
researchers. Following this, all data was rechecked by both researchers independently. 
The data set was also checked for outliers and/or mistyped data inputs by analysis of 
scatterplots. Analysis of the data was originally conducted using SPSS Statistics, 
version 19 (IBM, 2010) and subsequently analyzed during this current study using 
SPSS Statistics, version 25 (IBM, 2017). 
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Missing Data 
 During the informed consent procedures of the original study, participants were 
informed that they were free to decline completion of particular tasks at any time without 
penalty as per the involved ethics boards. Some participants chose not to/or could not 
nominate a teacher to complete the BASC-2 forms. Thus, 13 of the 25 BASC-2 TRS 
forms were returned, leaving nearly half incomplete. It was speculated in the original 
study that due to the age range of the participants (16-21), many participants were not in a 
formal educational or training environment where a teacher would be present at the time 
of participation. This current study however did not analyze the teacher component of the 
BASC-2, as it was deemed irrelevant to the dependent variable. Additionally, one parent 
chose not to complete the BASC-2 parent report form due to time constraints. The 
missing data was not a concern for this current study, as both the teacher and parent 
reports were not being analyzed.  
Distributions 
 The data was examined for normality and outliers. To gain insight into whether 
the distributions were sufficiently normal, skewness and kurtosis values were examined. 
Skewness is a measure of the symmetry of the distribution, whereas kurtosis is a 
measurement of how peaked the distribution is (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). The relevant 
skewness and kurtosis values are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1  
Skewness and Kurtosis Values  
Measure Skewness Kurtosis 
1) Krug Asperger Disorder Index Composite 
2) GARS2 Autism Index 
3) WASI Full Scale IQ 
4) BarOn EQ-i:S Total EQ Score 
5) BASC-2 SRP (Social Stress) 
6) Eyes Test Revised 
.15 
-.25 
.18 
-.23 
1.44 (.178) 
-.15 
-1.87 
-.69 
-.14 
-.66 
3.71 (.019) 
-.82 
 
 To determine that the distribution is normal, the skewness and kurtosis values 
would have to fall somewhere between  2 (George & Mallery, 2003; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Values of zero would suggest that skewness and kurtosis are perfectly 
normal (George & Mallery, 2003). Values between  1 are considered excellent and the 
remaining values that fall within  2 are considered acceptable (George & Mallery, 
2003). As the values in Table 1 show, the majority of the distributions had excellent 
skewness and kurtosis values. Thus, this suggests that these distributions were 
sufficiently normal. It appears, however, that the distributions of the scores on the BASC-
2 SRP Social Stress subscales had moderate positive values, which suggests the 
distributions were slightly peaked. As suggested by Tabachnik and Fidell (2007), 
researchers of the original study conducted an examination of the distributions for 
outliers, which included replacing outliers with the mean group score which is meant to 
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produce a more normal distribution. The outlier, which was more than 2 standard 
deviations from the group mean, was replaced. Only one outlier was replaced for this 
scale. The new values after outliers were replaced are reported in Table 1 in parenthesis 
beside the original values and are now considered excellent values.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics were calculated for all variables relevant to this study. The 
descriptive statistics for the HFASD group and the typically developing control group are 
listed in Table 2, including mean scores, standard deviations, minimum and maximum 
values, and sample size of each of the variables. 
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable (Sample Size) 
M (SD) Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
1) Krug Asperger Disorder Index               
HFASD Group (33)  
Control Group (33)                             
 
2) GARS-2 Autism Index                                
HFASD Group (34)  
Control Group (33)                             
 
3) WASI FSIQ                                            
HFASD Group (35)                           
Control Group (35)                             
 
4) BarOn Emotion Quotient Inventory       
HFASD Group (35)                            
Control Group (35)                             
 
5) BASC-2 SRP (Social Stress)                 
HFASD Group (35)                            
Control Group (35)                             
  
6) Eyes Test Revised                                  
HFASD Group (35)                               
Control Group (35)                                 
 
90.73 (15.25) 
0 (0) 
 
 
77.18 (17.80) 
24.58 (26.52) 
 
 
112.06 (11.37) 
110.20 (8.66) 
 
 
83.86 (15.05) 
100.26 (12.55) 
 
 
54.83 (10.66) 
46.66 (6.60) 
 
 
24.86 (3.64) 
26.74 (3.28) 
 
45 
0 
 
 
43 
0 
 
 
88 
93 
 
 
56 
62 
 
 
38 
36 
 
 
18 
19 
 
118 
0 
 
 
139 
70 
 
 
138 
124 
 
 
116 
119 
 
 
92 
65 
 
 
32 
31 
 
Research Question One 
 A multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine to what extent increases 
in performances on an advanced theory of mind test and on an emotional intelligence 
inventory affect the social stress levels of adolescents with HFASD and those who are 
typically developing. 
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A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict social stress based on 
emotional intelligence and theory of mind in both groups. Collinearity diagnostics were 
within acceptable guidelines for both groups. A significant regression was found in the 
group with HFASD (F(2,32) = 7.02, p < .01), with an R2 of .31. The regression equation 
for the participants’ predicted social stress is equal to 68.44 + .62 (theory of mind) -.35 
(emotional intelligence), where theory of mind is coded or measured as points on the 
Eyes Test Revised scale and emotional intelligence is measured as points on the BarOn 
Emotional Quotient Inventory Short Form. The sample multiple correlation coefficient 
was .55, indicating that approximately 31% of the variance of social stress in the HFASD 
sample can be accounted for by the linear combination of emotional intelligence and 
theory of mind.  
 In Table 3, indices were included to indicate the relative strength of the individual 
predictors in the HFASD group. In the HFASD group, the bivariate correlations between 
the BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory and the Social Stress measure were negative, 
suggesting they are inversely related, which supports the original hypothesis. This 
correlation was statistically significant, p < .05. The Eyes Test Revised had a positive 
relationship, which supported the original hypothesis, however the results were not 
statistically significant, p > .05. The BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory alone predicts 
26% (-.510 = .26) of the variance of social stress, while the Eyes Test revised only 
contributed an additional 5% of the variance (31% - 26% = 5%). Thus, it is tempting to 
conclude that the only useful predictor of social stress in the HFASD group is emotional 
intelligence as measured by the BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory.  
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Table 3 
The Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors with Social Stress in the HFASD 
group  
 
 
 
Predictors 
Correlations between each 
predictor and the social 
stress index 
Correlations between each 
predictor and the social 
stress index controlling for 
all other predictors 
Bar-On Emotional 
Quotient Inventory 
 
Eyes Test Revised 
-.51* 
 
 
.26 
-.50* 
 
 
.25 
*p < .05 
A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict social stress based on 
emotional intelligence and theory of mind in the control group as well. A significant 
regression equation was found (F(2,32) = 16.76, p < .01), with an R2 of .51. The 
regression equation for the participants’ predicted social stress is equal to 89.84 - .37 
(emotional intelligence) - .23 (theory of mind) where theory of mind is coded or 
measured as points on the Eyes Test Revised scale and emotional intelligence is 
measured as points on the BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory Short Form. The sample 
multiple correlation coefficient was .72, indicating that approximately 51% of the 
variance of social stress in the control group can be accounted for by linear combination 
of emotional intelligence and theory of mind. 
In Table 4, indices are included indicating the relative strength of the individual 
predictors in the control group. In the control group, the bivariate correlations between 
the BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory and the Social Stress measure were negative, 
suggesting they are inversely related, which aligned with the original hypothesis. This 
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correlation was statistically significant, p < .05. The Eyes Test Revised had a negative 
relationship, which supported the original hypothesis, however the results were not 
statistically significant. The BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory alone predicts 50% (-
.706 = .50) of the variance of social stress, while the Eyes Test revised only contributed 
an additional 1% of the variance (51% - 50% = 1%). Thus, aligning with the results from 
the HFASD group, it appears that the only useful predictor of social stress in the control 
group is the BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory. 
Table 4 
The Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors with Social Stress in the Control 
Group 
 
 
 
Predictors 
Correlations between each 
predictor and the social 
stress index 
Correlations between each 
predictor and the social 
stress index controlling for 
all other predictors 
Bar-On Emotional 
Quotient Inventory 
 
Eyes Test Revised 
-.71* 
 
 
-.15 
-.71* 
 
 
-.16 
*p < .005 
Research Question Two 
 A one-way MANOVA was used to investigate how the scores on an advanced 
theory of mind test and on an emotional intelligence inventory affect social stress levels 
differently for individuals with HFASD when compared to their age- and sex-matched 
typically developing peers. 
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A MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or 
more mean differences between the HFASD group and the typically developing group on 
their emotional intelligence, theory of mind, and social stress inventory scores. Results of 
the MANOVA with three dependent variables (emotional intelligence, theory of mind, 
and social stress) show a significant main effect size for differences between groups 
separated by whether or not there was a diagnoses of HFASD, F (3,66) = 10.66, p < .05, 
effect size = .33, power = 1.00. Thus, being that the multivariate effect size was estimated 
at .33, it is implied that 33% of the variance in the dependent variables was accounted for 
by presence of a HFASD diagnosis.  
With respect to univariate main effects, emotional intelligence was significant (p 
< .05) with diagnosis in groups, F (1,68) = 24.5, effect size = .27, power = 1.00. The 
social stress scale was significant (p < .05) with diagnosis in groups, F (1,68) = 14.87, 
effect size = .18, power = 97. And finally, the theory of mind test was also significant (p 
< .05), thus groups differed significantly on this inventory, F (1, 68) = 5.19, effect size = 
.07, power = .61. For a visual representation of the means and standard deviations of 
these variables between groups, see Table 2. 
Chapter 5: Discussion 
 Within this section, a summary of all the major findings from this study are 
presented, paired with a discussion of relevant previous literature findings. The aims of 
this study were to investigate how emotional intelligence, theory of mind levels, and 
social stress manifest in those with HFASD and those who are typically developing.  
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 Interpretation of results 
The first research question was to examine the extent that increases in performance on an 
advanced theory of mind test and an emotional intelligence inventory affect the social 
stress levels of adolescents with HFASD. As mentioned above, it was hypothesized that 
when theory of mind increases, there may be an increase in social stress; however, 
concurrently increasing emotional intelligence may reduce social stress. The results of 
this study suggest these hypotheses are correct. The combination of high-performance 
levels on a theory of mind measure and poor performance on an emotional intelligence 
inventory significantly predicted higher levels of social stress. This unique combination 
of theory of mind and emotional intelligence accounted for 31% of the variance of social 
stress in the HFASD sample. This finding was confirmed when examining theory of mind 
and emotional intelligence as individual predictors of social stress. Importantly however, 
the examination of the effect of variables independently indicates that theory of mind 
does not have a statistically significant relationship with social stress; emotional 
intelligence is independently responsible for the majority of the variance in social stress.  
 After determining the relationship between these variables in the HFASD group, 
the typically developing control group was examined. It was originally predicted that 
unlike the HFASD group, theory of mind and emotional intelligence scores would both 
decrease social stress levels in the control group. The results of this study suggest that 
this hypothesis is correct, as both theory of mind and emotional intelligence had a 
significant negative relationship with social stress. Thus, as an individual’s theory of 
mind and emotional intelligence performance increased, it predicted a decrease in social 
stress. Taken together, theory of mind and emotional intelligence were responsible for 
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51% of the variance in social stress in this group. As also noted in the analysis of 
participants with HFASD, theory of mind did not have a statistically significant 
independent relationship to social stress in this group. Thus, emotional intelligence, 
which was significantly related to social stress, accounted for almost all of the previously 
listed variance in social stress.  
 Taken together, the results from both groups suggest that theory of mind and 
emotional intelligence had an effect on social stress levels. The directions of the 
relationships matched predictions, as high emotional intelligence predicted low social 
stress in both groups, whereas theory of mind increased social stress and decreased social 
stress in the HFASD group and control group, respectively. However, the insignificant 
effect of theory of mind on social stress was not hypothesized. It was speculated that 
theory of mind would significantly predict social stress in both groups. This hypothesis 
was based on previous research that suggests theory of mind can impact one’s level of 
social awareness and functioning (Hadwin et al., 1997; Hofmann et al., 2016), which may 
be directly related to the amount of stress experienced in a social situation (Frith, 2004; 
Bellini, 2004). One potential reason theory of mind did not significantly predict social 
stress independently could be a lack of a direct relationship between these two concepts. 
Previous research has found that while some benefits occur during theory of mind 
focused interventions in ASD populations, there is a lack of skills maintained, 
generalizability to other settings, or developmental effects of related skills (Fletcher-
Watson, McConnel, Manola, & McConachie, 2014). Thus, these interventions have 
limited effects, including a lack of effect ultimately, on one’s stress levels. Nevertheless, 
when taken together, theory of mind and emotional intelligence did significantly predict 
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social stress, which suggests theory of mind is related to social stress when paired with 
emotional intelligence, even if insignificant on its own. This study provides preliminary 
evidence to suggest that the relationship between theory of mind and social stress is not 
strong without emotional intelligence, which has implications for the current state of 
interventions for HFASD, as theory of mind is the typical foci (Fletcher-Watson et al., 
2014).  
 The second research question examined the extent to which performance on 
theory of mind and emotional intelligence measures affect social stress levels differently 
for individuals with HFASD as compared to their typically developing peers. As 
mentioned previously, it was hypothesized that the HFASD group would score 
significantly lower on the theory of mind and emotional intelligence measures and 
significantly higher on the social stress measure when compared to their typically 
developing peers. The results of this study suggest that these hypotheses were correct. 
The means of all three variables, namely theory of mind, emotional intelligence, and 
social stress, significantly differed between the HFASD and the typically developing 
group. Specifically, results suggest that 33% of the variance in these variables could be 
accounted for by whether or not the individual had a diagnosis of HFASD. These results 
suggest that theory of mind and emotional intelligence impact individuals with HFASD 
differently when compared to those that are typically developing, which consequently has 
important implications for social stress levels.    
Emotional Intelligence 
The findings of the current study extend the findings of previous research (e.g., 
Salguero, Palomera, & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2012), demonstrating that emotional 
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intelligence has important implications for the long-term outcomes of adolescents. Low 
levels of emotional intelligence in typically developing individuals has been associated 
with poor psychological adjustment in adolescents, including increased social stress and 
mental health concerns (Salguero et al., 2012). It appears that low levels of emotional 
intelligence similarly affect individuals with HFASD. Low emotional intelligence and 
emotional regulation has been cited as a common risk factor for depression and anxiety 
disorders among both those with HFASD and those that are typically developing 
(Mazefsky et al., 2014). These potential negative outcomes are a significant concern for 
individuals with HFASD, as they tend to have less a developed emotional intelligence 
relative to their typically developing peers, as has been highlighted in this study. 
Individuals with HFASD typically experience deficits in many areas of emotional 
intelligence, including emotion recognition (Petrides et al., 2011), self-awareness of one’s 
own emotions (Williams, 2010), and emotional regulation (Mazefsky, Borue, Day, & 
Minshew, 2014).  
Components of emotional intelligence involving perception and recognition of 
one’s own and others’ emotions, an understanding of what these emotions mean within a 
social context, and the ability to use this knowledge to appropriately respond, are 
particularly difficult for individuals with HFASD (Petrides et al., 2011). This is often 
problematic in interpersonal relationships, as difficulty understanding the emotion states 
of others may lead to misunderstandings and miscommunication. There are additional 
risk factors for individuals with HFASD, including potential negative intrapersonal 
implications. As an example, the underdeveloped emotional intelligence typically 
observed in individuals with HFASD contributes to the emotional dysregulation also 
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experienced in this population (Samson et al., 2014). Underdeveloped emotional 
regulation has been related to difficulties in social communication (Samson et al., 2014), 
as well as higher levels of psychopathology in this population, such as developing a 
comorbid clinical disorder (Mazefsky et al., 2014). Additionally, deficits in emotional 
regulation play a role in how stress is managed. The inability to appropriately adapt and 
modify emotional responses when facing stressful social interaction is likely to contribute 
to the elevated levels of stress experienced by this population, as a result of more 
pronounced and prolonged feelings of distress (Mazefsky et al., 2013; Mazefsky et al., 
2014). Therefore, emotional intelligence has important implications for not only for the 
social success of individuals with HFASD, but also their general mental health and well 
being.  
Enhancing one’s emotional intelligence is likely to have significant implications 
for how stressful social situations are approached. Trait emotional intelligence includes 
one’s stress management abilities, including stress tolerance and impulse management 
(Bar-On, 1997). Additionally, trait emotional intelligence includes one’s adaptability, 
which includes flexibility (Bar-On, 1997). These aspects of emotional intelligence will 
help individuals with HFASD reduce the stress they feel when interacting with others. 
The results of this study support previous findings, as the individuals who had relatively 
high emotional intelligence showed a tendency to experience lower stress levels in social 
situations (Salguero et al., 2012). However, as mentioned above, high levels of emotional 
intelligence are typically not found in individuals with HFASD (Petrides et al., 2011). If 
current interventions continue to focus on increasing theory of mind without the 
necessary emotional intelligence skills of stress management and flexibility, it may have 
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unintended negative consequences for the wellbeing of this population. Further developed 
theory of mind may allow for increased insight into the thoughts and feelings of others 
towards individuals with HFASD. When paired with a less developed emotional 
intelligence, or abilities to respond to and manage the stress caused from this enhanced 
insight, social stress is at risk of becoming further exacerbated.  
Theory of Mind 
 Despite theory of mind’s insignificant statistical impact on social stress on its 
own, it did play a significant role in predicting social stress when combined with 
emotional intelligence. This finding extends previous research that indicated that an 
increased theory of mind predicts successful social interactions (Wellman, 1990). These 
theory of mind abilities frequently allow individuals to develop a better understanding of 
their communicative partner, which may lead to a more positive perception of the 
individual amongst peers (Sergienko & Ulanova, 2016; Slaughter et al., 2015). It is 
possible however, that teaching knowledge of other’s mental states does not equate to the 
development of social communicative or emotional regulatory abilities. The results of 
this study suggest that if interventions related to theory of mind development are 
provided independent of any other social or emotional skill development, social stress 
may rise. It is speculated that this may be due to the heightened insight into the thoughts, 
feelings, and perceptions of others, as well as their difficulty responding to that increased 
insight. Consequently, in light of previous research (Montgomery et al., 2012; Petrides et 
al., 2011) and the result of the current study, it appears that interventions to further 
develop theory of mind should concurrently include interventions to further emotional 
intelligence.  
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The individuals with HFASD in this current study differed significantly from their 
typically developing peers in their performance on a theory of mind measure, which 
appears to be supported in the research (Hoogenhout & Malcolm-Smith, 2014) and in the 
diagnostic criteria of ASD that identifies the characteristic social and emotional 
difficulties this population faces (APA, 2013). This population may develop theory of 
mind at a different rate or through different means than their typically developing peers 
(Hoogenhout & Malcolm-Smith, 2014). Thus, it is important that a different approach to 
teaching theory of mind be used for typically developing individuals relative to those 
with HFASD. The current approach to teaching theory of mind to typically developing 
individuals involves one-on-one short sessions that focus on corrective feedback, 
modeling, use of imagination, and role-play (Hofmann et al., 2016). Although this type of 
intervention had positive results for typically developing individuals (Hofmann et al., 
2016), a different approach may be more successful for those with HFASD. Specifically, 
previous research has highlighted that individuals with HFASD are often able to 
cognitively conceptualize theory of mind concepts but may also struggle when applying 
this knowledge in practice (Hadwin et al., 1997; Begeer et al., 2011). Thus, although the 
one-to-one knowledge building aspect of this type of training may still be important with 
this population (Bauminger, 2002), it may be beneficial to incorporate peer to peer 
interaction as a learning tool, which may allow for concurrent development of emotional 
intelligence (Chang & Locke, 2016). Incorporating peer mediated instruction and 
intervention strategies has shown to be an effective and evidence-based method for aiding 
youth with ASD in social and communication skill development (Sperry, Neitzel, & 
Engelhardt-Wells, 2010; Zagona & Mastergeorge, 2016). In an intervention that 
  
  
58 
incorporates peer mediation, typically developing peers would be taught ways to interact 
and help peers with HFASD build their social skills in natural environments (Sperry et 
al., 2010). If typically developing individuals, who have an understanding of theory of 
mind, are paired with peers with HFASD to teach the core components of theory of mind, 
while simultaneous modelling and practicing emotional intelligence skills, they may be 
able to develop these skills concurrently. Specifically, focusing on emotional recognition, 
understanding, and appropriate emotional self-regulation may allow for not only an 
increased understanding of others, but additionally an ability to apply these concepts to 
realistic, fluid social settings with peers. If theory of mind and emotional intelligence are 
both included in interventions, it seems likely that the social outcomes of individuals on 
the spectrum will also be improved, thereby decreasing unintended increases in social 
stress.  
Social Stress 
The impact of social stress on individuals with HFASD has been highlighted in 
previous research (Bellini, 2004; Morgan, 2006). This study highlights the higher level of 
social stress experienced by individuals with HFASD, relative to their typically 
developing peers. Consistent with findings from this study, previous research suggests 
that individuals with HFASD typically experience elevated levels of social stress 
(Attwood, 2006; Bellini, 2004; Morgan, 2006). Stress is so prevalent in this population 
that it has been suggested that it may be a core component of ASD (Morgan, 2006). 
Social stress arises in many different contexts and is often related to the constantly 
changing and unpredictable nature of social interactions (Attwood, 2006). Additionally, it 
has also been suggested that there is a link between one’s social skills deficits and social 
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anxiety (Bellini, 2004). Thus, the results of this study and previous literature suggest that 
heightened social stress is a common experience for many individuals with HFASD. 
There is research however, that contradicts the suggestion that those with HFASD 
experience higher stress levels than their typically developing peers. Researchers have 
speculated that in a socially stressful situation, individuals with ASD do not differ in their 
cortisol reactivity, or stress response, from the typically developing control group 
(Jansen, Gispen-de Wied, van der Gaag, & van Engeland, 2003). Further, it has been 
suggested that individuals with ASD may actually have a diminished or blunted stress 
response when exposed to a potentially threatening social evaluation (Corbett, 
Muscatello, & Baldinger, 2019; Edmiston, Blain, & Corbett, 2016; Lanni, Schupp, 
Simon, & Corbett, 2012). This blunted stress response has been speculated to relate to the 
way that these individuals perceive the event, such that the participants in the study with 
ASD did not find the social evaluation threatening (Corbett et al., 2019). For a situation 
to provoke a stress response in an individual, it must be perceived as personally 
threatening (Corbett et al., 2019; Evans et al., 2013). Therefore, it is believed that because 
these individuals have difficulty identifying facial affect, also known as a low theory of 
mind, that they are not stressed by the negative evaluation (Corbett et al., 2019). 
Although this research was done with individuals with ASD in general, this may be 
applicable to individuals with HFASD as a part of this larger group that experiences 
theory of mind deficits (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). These findings regarding how stress 
affects this population relates directly to the results of this current study, which suggest 
that raising the theory of mind in an individual with HFASD could predict higher levels 
of social stress.  
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 Unfortunately, heightened social stress in individuals with HFASD can have long-
term negative effects. One of the notable consequences of heighted stress is the 
worsening of ASD symptomatology (Khor et al., 2014). Thus, stress may worsen the 
social challenges that individuals with HFASD experience. Further, heightened social 
stress in individuals with HFASD is related to heightened symptoms of anxiety (Gillott & 
Standen, 2007). Anxiety disorders are often comorbid with ASD (APA, 2013; Hofvander 
et al., 2009), affecting anywhere between 11% to 84% of this population (White, Oswald, 
Ollendick, & Scahill, 2009). Furthermore, individuals with HFASD have been reported as 
being more likely than other individuals with ASD to experience an anxiety concern 
(White et al., 2009). Specifically, social anxiety has been found to be the most frequently 
reported anxiety-related concern within this population (Bellini, 2006; Kuusikko et al., 
2008; Melfsen et al., 2006). It is crucial to prevent social stress from escalating to 
clinically distressing levels. In addition, the effects of stress and anxiety regarding social 
interactions may continue, as individuals with HFASD who have heightened levels of 
anxiety also have been reported to display heightened levels of loneliness (White & 
Roberson-Nay, 2009). If people with HFASD withdraw socially, they are more likely to 
experience depressive symptomatology, which may further their social difficulties (White 
& Roberson-Nay, 2009).   
 The social anxiety and stress experienced by this population not only negatively 
impacts their own mental health but can also have cascading effects to the wellbeing of 
the caregivers of these individuals. Caregivers of individuals with HFASD typically 
experience negative health consequences, including somatic symptoms, depression, 
anxiety, and poorer self-perceived general health (Ruiz-Robledillo & Moya-Albiol, 
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2013). The individual’s severity of ASD symptomatology, which may worsen with high 
levels of social stress (Khon et al., 2014), has been noted as a strong predictor of 
caregiver stress (Lyons, Leon, Roecker Phulps, & Dunleavy, 2010). The daily social 
stress that an adolescent experiences could therefore have a direct impact on the stress of 
the caregiver. Research suggests that emotional intelligence also affects the caregivers of 
these individuals, and improving emotional intelligence may decrease cortisol levels, as 
well as improve overall health (Ruiz-Robledillo & Moya-Albiol, 2014). Thus, previous 
findings in conjunction with the results of the current study suggest that interventions that 
engage both the adolescent with HFASD and their caregiver in improving their emotional 
intelligence may have positively impact their levels of social stress, as well as the 
caregivers’ well-being. 
 Many interventions for youth with HFASD focus on increasing theory of mind, as 
it is believed that the deficit in this area is responsible for many of the social and 
communicative difficulties this population experiences (Hoogenhout & Malcolm-Smith, 
2014; Mazza et al., 2017). Although the results of this study suggest the benefit and 
importance of also including all components of emotional intelligence in theory of mind 
interventions to decrease social stress levels, it may be important to focus most on the 
stress management aspect of emotional intelligence. Many interventions focus on the 
theorized source of the difficulties that individuals with ASD and HFASD experience, 
such as theory of mind (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2014), however they fail to teach real life, 
dynamic and fluid coping skills to these individuals. In other words, research and practice 
focus too heavily on addressing the primary source of the stress, such as not being aware 
of or understanding the thoughts and feelings of others, that they fail to actually teach 
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individuals the practical skills needed to respond to ever-changing social interaction and 
how to manage the stress itself. Many interventions lack a social stress reduction 
component (e.g., Fletcher-Watson et al., 2014), and after examining the multiple negative 
effects of increased social stress, teaching stress reduction and coping strategies may be a 
very crucial aspect to improving well-being in this population. More research is needed 
regarding how stress effects this population and the best method to mediate this, however 
it is likely to be beneficial to focus on the stress-management aspect of emotional 
intelligence may as a first step.   
The current study is one of few that has examined the specific relationship 
between theory of mind, emotional intelligence, and social stress in individuals with 
HFASD (Montgomery et al., 2012). Other researchers have also identified the limited 
research that examines the psychosocial outcomes for individuals with HFASD 
(Hofvander et al., 2009). Specifically, there is a lack of understanding of emotional 
intelligence in this population, including the role of emotional regulation (Mazefsky et 
al., 2013). The lack of understanding of emotional intelligence in this population may 
speak to why it appears to have been overlooked as a focus for interventions. 
Additionally, the stress response in those with HFASD is not well understood (Taylor & 
Corbett, 2014), particularly when looking at social stress specifically (Levine et al., 
2017). Furthermore, the experience of stress is understudied in adolescents with HFASD, 
as research with this population typically focuses on children or adults (Edmiston et al., 
2016). Adolescence is a critical developmental period in life to examine social stress, as 
this age group typically experiences more social evaluative threats (Edmiston et al., 
2016). Consequently, practitioners may not be fully aware of the elevated stress this 
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specific population experiences, and the potential positive impact that further developing 
emotional intelligence could have.  
Implications for Practitioners and Therapists 
 The results of this study suggest that interventions designed to improve theory of 
mind in individuals may not directly affect social stress. In instances in which enhanced 
theory of mind has been associated with social stress, it appears to have unintentionally 
contributed to an increase in social stress. Interventions aimed at assisting adolescents to 
better understand others’ thoughts, feelings, and mental states may unintentionally 
exacerbate their social difficulties by increasing their awareness of the social challenges 
they experience and ultimately cause them more distress (Khor et al., 2014).  
The results of this study suggest that emotional intelligence plays a critical role in 
the effectiveness of social and emotional interventions provided to individuals on the 
autism spectrum. Instead of focusing solely on theory of mind, it appears that further 
development of emotional intelligence is also crucial. Enhanced emotional intelligence 
appears to assist in the fluid, adaptive application of social and emotional knowledge in 
ever-changing social situations and ultimately reduced levels of social stress. Further 
research is needed to determine the effectiveness of providing interventions aimed at 
further developing theory of mind, however, the results of this study suggest that 
emotional intelligence has the greatest effect on the social stress levels in this population. 
As a result, it appears it may be beneficial for practitioners in school, home, and 
community settings to focus on not only further developing perspective-taking abilities, 
but also on how to apply the social and emotional knowledge and skills they have. It 
would be important to do so in a manner that allows them to do so both appropriately and 
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flexibly, drawing not only on the thoughts and feelings of others, but also the 
management and regulation of their own thoughts and emotions in social contexts.  
Proposed interventions may include the previously mentioned combined 
conceptual model approach in which individuals are able to further develop both theory 
of mind and emotional intelligence concurrently and are given the opportunity to practice 
these skills with their peers in practical settings. Bauminger’s (2006) study examining the 
effectiveness of teaching social cognitive capabilities on the social interactions in youth 
with HFASD through cognitive-behavioral, ecological and social skill training in a group 
setting. This type of intervention reportedly increased the individual’s theory of mind, 
executive function, and their ability to apply this knowledge into successful peer 
interactions (Bauminger, 2006). The children in this study demonstrated an overall 
improvement in their ability to work collaboratively with their peers, including 
developing the skills to engage in mutual planning, cooperative work, and sharing 
(Bauminger, 2006), which could possibly suggest that there was an increase in emotional 
intelligence. However, this type of group intervention only encouraged individuals to 
interact with their peers inside of the group setting, thus, their skills were not 
generalizable to their interactions with peers in other school settings, such as recess. 
Bauminger (2002) also investigated how this same type of intervention approach, but in 
an individual setting, would influence their social cognitive comprehension and social 
interaction abilities. One of the components of this individual approach was to match 
participants with a peer to interact with during recess and parents were encouraged to 
engage in interactions at home that are related to the skills being taught in the 
intervention (Bauminger, 2002). Thus, the learned behaviours from the intervention were 
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practiced in different social settings, such as class, school recesses, and at home, which 
predicted an increase in spontaneous positive peer interaction (Bauminger, 2002). The 
results from Bauminger’s (2002, 2006) studies and Sperry and colleagues (2010) research 
on the importance of peer involvement in interventions suggest that engaging individuals 
with HFASD a group format intervention that encourages practice of these skills with 
peers in various social settings may increase the generalization of their social cognitive 
and interaction abilities. Thus, this intervention could have positive impacts on the 
participant’s theory of mind and emotional intelligence. Therefore, despite explicit 
investigation on how the intervention in Bauminger’s (2002, 2006) studies affects one’s 
social stress levels, the results of this current study that suggest emotional intelligence has 
a significant inverse relationship to social stress may allow for speculation that this type 
of intervention may also have a positive impact on social stress. Further research 
investigating the impact of this type of intervention on social stress would be beneficial. 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) may also provide insight regarding how to 
structure social and emotional interventions for individuals with HFASD (Ung, Selles, 
Small, & Storch, 2015). When considering the needs of individuals with HFASD, this 
type of therapy may be beneficial as CBT typically focusses on both skills training and 
application and practice of these skills (Sze & Wood, 2007). Thus, CBT not only focuses 
on faulty cognitions and understandings of oneself, others, and the world, but also 
engages the individual in social skill building and the application of these social skills. 
Six core components that have been deemed as important in the literature to be cognizant 
of when doing CBT with an individual who has HFASD to ensure their learning needs 
are met, including: (a) assessment of the nature and degree of the problem, (b) affective 
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education, (c) cognitive restructuring, (d) stress or anxiety management, (e) self-
reflection, and (f) the practice of new cognitive skills (Attwood, 2003). These 
components address all variables examined in this current study, including theory of mind 
through affective education, emotional intelligence through self-reflection and practicing 
new cognitive skills, and social stress through stress management techniques. Perhaps by 
focusing on increasing both theory of mind and emotional intelligence through CBT, 
social stress may be consequently decreased. This outcome has been reported in a case 
study of an individual with HFASD who was diagnosed with social anxiety disorder and 
was subsequently treated with CBT, which led to positive social and emotional outcomes 
(Cardaciotto & Herbert, 2004). Aspects of CBT including cognitive restructuring, role-
playing, and homework assignments were used to address fear and avoidance of social 
situations, and profoundly impacted the individual through a significant decrease in both 
social anxiety and depressive symptoms (Cardaciotto & Herbert, 2004). CBT has the 
ability to decrease social anxiety, a potentially more impairing and pervasive form of 
social stress, and it may therefore be beneficial for individuals with HFASD who 
experience stress as a result of their social and emotional difficulties. 
The creation of a peer-mediated group in schools and community organizations 
that draws from the CBT model may assist practitioners in increasing emotional 
intelligence, which also contributes to stress management skills (Laugeson & Park, 
2014). Although social stress may decrease in these interventions, it is also important that 
practitioners, teachers, parents, and other care providers view this decrease as a goal 
itself, rather than simply a positive side effect of these interventions. It is critically 
important that those working with youth with HFASD recognize the significant social 
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stress experienced by this population and increase their focus accordingly on further 
developing stress management skills. Believing social stress will decrease through theory 
of mind interventions, which do not directly teach stress management skills, may 
undermine the potential significant of the impact of stress. Social stress should not be 
thought of as an unintended but welcomed outcome of interventions, but should instead 
become one of the primary foci of interventions. A focus on not only further developing 
emotional intelligence components of intrapersonal and interpersonal skills, but also 
stress management skills is likely to further promote the social and emotional resiliency 
of youth with HFASD. As such, incorporating both psychoeducation and application in 
social stress management at home, school, and in the community appears to be a critical 
addition to the current intervention efforts.  
In summary, it is important that interventions for individuals with HFASD 
incorporate both social and emotional skill building and application of these skills to 
ensure the best outcomes for this population. Providing group programs that focus on 
improving both theory of mind and emotional intelligence in schools or community 
centres may allow this population the best opportunity to improve their social stress 
levels. Additionally, spreading awareness of the effects of interventions that solely focus 
on theory of mind to professionals who work with individuals on the spectrum may 
inspire changes in current programming. 
Study Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 Sample Size. One of the major limitations of this study is the relatively small 
sample size. Using a sample of 35 individuals for the HFASD and the control group to 
equal 70 participants total limits generalizability. Additionally, the sample was chosen 
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based on accessibility, rather than having a randomly selected sample. This again may 
limit the generalizability of the results of this study. Importantly, however, despite the 
small sample size, this current study had enough participants to obtain some statistically 
significant results. Furthermore, it can be argued that because adolescents with HFASD 
are a specific sub-population of the broader autism spectrum population, each individual 
participant may represent a larger group. In addition, sampling from a larger geographical 
area would have allowed for not only a larger sample, but also may have made random 
selection a possibility. Doing so in future studies may increase generalizability and allow 
greater deductions to be made from results. 
Self-Report. Self-report measures represent another major limitation of this 
study. Measuring one’s emotional intelligence through self-report measures could 
produce biased results. It is possible that an individual with HFASD may not have a full 
understanding of their social and emotional challenges, and/or the severity of those 
challenges. Future studies would benefit from the use of additional measures to gather 
information, such as using observation in conjunction with these self-report measures. 
Importantly however, previous research conducted with individuals with HFASD 
regarding their anxiety has supported the use of self-report due to the limited agreement 
between parent and self-reports of the youths’ experience of anxiety (White & Roberson-
Nay, 2009). It has been suggested that anxiety is an internal process that parents may not 
be able to accurately gauge in their child (Mazefsky et al., 2014). Consequently, the 
researchers chose not to use the parent-report scales of Interpersonal Skills on the BASC-
2 to inform the social stress levels of the participants due to the irrelevance of it to the 
dependant variable of social stress and an inconsistency in previous research between 
  
  
69 
parent and self report results on the BASC-2 (Taylor et al., 2018). Examination of the 
parent and self report scales on the BASC-2 with individuals with HFASD revealed 
significantly discrepant results (Taylor et al., 2018). Research with individuals with 
HFASD has also highlighted the lack of association between self reported anxiety and 
parent-reported social functioning (White & Roberson-Nay, 2009). Thus, examining this 
parent report scale did not appear to provide greater insight into the very subjective and 
individual experience of social stress. Although self-report may provide important insight 
into an individual’s experience of social stress, it also may be beneficial to also utilize a 
measure of physiological stress. The Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) is a laboratory 
paradigm that involves exposing an individual to a social evaluative threat to examine the 
cortisol and behavioural response (Buske-Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993). This 
method has been used to measure social stress with individuals with ASD and those that 
are typically developing (Lanni, Schupp, Simon, & Corbett, 2012; Edmiston et al., 2016). 
A final consideration when determining appropriate measures of social stress with 
validity evidence in future studies is the importance of context, as individuals with ASD 
may display different patterns of stress responses depending on the type of social stressor 
(Corbett et al., 2019). It is important to note that the BASC-2 allowed for sufficient 
examination of social stress for the present study; this assessment instrument has good 
reliability and validity (Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004) and is a commonly used 
assessment measure with individuals with HFASD (e.g., Lopata et al. 2010; Mitchell, 
Mrug, Patterson, Bailey, & Hodgens, 2015; Taylor et al., 2018).  
 Diagnostic Consideration. The diagnostic changes that have occurred as a result 
of the most recent revision of the DSM regarding ASD highlight another limitation of this 
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study. The data analyzed in this study was originally conducted prior to the 2013 
revisions to the DSM. Therefore, participants were recruited using AS criteria and 
inclusionary measures, which no longer exists in the current fifth edition of the DSM. 
Consequently, the conclusions drawn from this study’s findings may be more 
generalizable if this study were done with the current diagnostic criteria of HFASD, as it 
may be more broad than AS. Importantly however, as discussed previously, individuals 
with AS would now be diagnosed with ASD without intellectual and language 
impairments, and thus this limitation can also be viewed as a strength as it controls for he 
underdeveloped intellectual and language abilities that would significantly confound any 
findings of social and emotional difficulties that require these competent intellectual and 
language abilities. 
 Future Research. Future research examining not only how emotional intelligence 
and theory of mind effect social stress in individuals with HFASD, but additionally look 
at how the further development of these concepts relate to their observed social abilities 
would likely be of great benefit. Investigating the long-term effects of these interventions 
on both social stress and social skills through a randomized or quasi-randomized 
experimental design would provide even greater insight into the relationship between 
these factors and potentially implications for causation.  
 Finally, conducting future research that compares and contrasts different types of 
interventions aimed at furthering theory of mind and emotional intelligence both 
independently and concurrently could have important implications for the wellbeing of 
individuals with HFASD. This type of research may ultimately increase the effectiveness 
of interventions for youth on the autism spectrum. 
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Summary 
Despite the aforementioned limitations, the results of this study revealed that 
emotional intelligence, but not theory of mind, predicted self-reported social stress levels 
in individuals with HFASD and those that are typically developing. Importantly however, 
emotional intelligence and theory of mind together significantly predicted social stress 
levels for both groups. Furthermore, the combination of a well-developed theory of mind 
and an underdeveloped emotional intelligence in individuals with HFASD is predictive of 
high social stress levels. As such, interventions for those with HFASD that focus solely 
on increasing theory of mind, without concurrently developing emotional intelligence, 
may unintentionally create social stress. Interventions that address social and emotional 
challenges utilizing both theory of mind and emotional intelligence components therefore 
appear to hold great promise. Although these two concepts are distinct, the results of this 
study suggest they should be paired in interventions to promote social and emotional 
wellness. Intervention efforts focused on enhancing both theory of mind and emotional 
intelligence for individuals with HFASD may be incredibly beneficial. Further, 
interventions are likely to greatly benefit from the incorporation of practical applications 
of social and emotional knowledge. Specifically, introducing a peer group-based program 
that provides psychoeducation regarding emotion awareness, understanding, and 
recognition in oneself and others, as well as emotional regulation, and appropriate and 
flexible ways to respond in emotionally laden contexts is likely to have a positive impact 
in the lives of individuals with HFASD. In sum, although the results of this study are 
preliminary, they strongly suggest that the social and emotional challenges that 
individuals with HFASD experience is multifaceted, and both theory of mind and 
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emotional intelligence are likely to cumulatively contribute to increased positive social 
and emotional outcomes in youth on the autism spectrum during their critical transition 
into adulthood.   
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